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PREVENTIVE "MEDICINE" FOR MEDICAL
DEVICES: IS FURTHER REGULATION
REQUIRED?
BRUCE C. DAVIDSON*
INTRODUCTION
One of the major trends in the development of the law of the
United States in this century has been an ever-increasing concern
for protection of the consumer. This concern has been spotlighted
in the past decade by the efforts of "consumer crusaders," who
have challenged manufacturers and demanded better and safer
products for the public.' These efforts have been effective because
they focused upon and publicized problems, complaints, and de-
fects which unorganized consumers, as individuals, have little
power to protest.
It is unfortunately true that consumer-protection legislation in
a particular area has usually not been passed until the need for such
legislation was dramatically demonstrated by some event that
aroused and united public outrage. The Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act evolved largely from such events, and its history
graphically demonstrates their catalytic effect on the legislative
process.
Under the present Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act there
exists an apparently inadvertently created and highly ambiguous
dichotomy between "drugs" and "devices" with respect to premar-
ket clearance requirements. This definitional dichotomy has
caused much confusion and created significant problems of statu-
tory construction for the courts. Moreover, this dichotomy,
* J.D., Harvard Law School; Associate, Quarles, Herriott, Clemons, Teschner &
Noelke, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
1. See R. NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED (1965). Mr. Nader has also become involved
with the problemsof unsafe medical devices. See, e.g., Mintz & Haseltine, About 1,200
Patients Get Electrocuted Yearly, Hearing Told, Washington (D.C.) Post, Feb. 20, 1969,
at _, col. _. This article was reprinted in 115 CONG. Rac. 4268 (1969). Even the Food
and Drug Administration, itself, has become a target of "Nader's Raiders." In a report
based on a two-year study, Nader and his student volunteer investigators "accused the
agency of conspiring with the food industry to defraud consumers and even to endanger their
health." TIME, April 20, 1970, at 18.
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whereby "new drugs" are subject to premarket regulation but new
"devices" are not, provides a loophole permitting people to be
directly or indirectly injured or otherwise harmed by medical de-
vices which are unsafe or ineffective (or both) for their intended
use.
It is ironic that Congress has acted to protect the consumer's
pocketbook from "predatory extensions of credit,"'2 while it has
failed to act to protect his person (and his pocketbook) from inju-
ries which he is virtually powerless to protect himself against. The
present status quo seems even more egregious in that the average
person has a false sense of security because he mistakenly believes
that the omniscient and omnipresent "Government" is protecting
him by setting standards and requiring premarket testing of medi-
cal devices-as is the case for articles classified as "new drugs."
Added to this is the fact that the "consumer" of a medical device
is usually in no position to make an intelligent, independent evalua-
tion of the device to be used upon or implanted within his body.
Even if he is not unconscious or so ill that he is incapable of
makinguny decision at all, the exigencies of the situation frequently
leave no alternative, or the person's state of mind may be so des-
perate that he will try anything. And, even if he were presented
with the opportunity to make a rational choice, the average person
does not possess the expertise to make it an intelligent one. More-
over, the "consumer" of a medical device normally does not buy
it himself; rather, it is used upon or placed within his body by
doctors or medical technicans, so that he is completely dependent
upon them for his safety-yet they, in turn, may know little or
nothing about the integrity of the device they are using.
Since the ultimate "consumer" of a medical device is normally
in no position to peruse before partaking, the existence of the
American ideal of a "free market,"without external regulation and
dependent on competition and the good-faith cooperation of manu-
facturers for voluntary standard-setting, is of little value and small
comfort to the "consumer" when he becomes the hapless and help-
less victim of an unsafe or ineffective medical device, marketed
without adequate testing and in disregard of whatever voluntary
standards may exist. Therefore, it would seem that there is a need
for federal standard-setting and premarket regulation with regard
to some types of medical devices.
2. Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(1) (1970).
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This article will attempt to review the circumstances leading up
to and culminating in the present status quo, analyze the current
*situation and its implications, and discuss the need and some of the
proposed measures for resolving the present dilemma.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FOOD AND DRUG LEGISLATION
What provisions there are for the federal regulation of medi-
cal devices are contained in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act. In order to discuss the present problems with respect to
medical devices, however, it is necessary to review the history of
food and drug legislation in the United States so as to see the
context in and from which these problems have developed.
Although legislation relating to food and drugs dates well back
into the nineteenth century,4 the first comprehensive legislation
designed to protect the public from impure and adulterated food
and drugs was not enacted until 1906. The Federal Food and Drugs
Act of 19065 was not easily enacted. The first bill to prevent the
adulteration of food was introduced in the House of Representa-
tives in 1879, but died in committee. In the twenty-seven year
interim, nearly two hundred related measures were similarly un-
successful." Passage of the 1906 Act was attributable primarily to
the zeal of one man, Dr. Harvey W. Wiley,7 who continually prod-
ded Congress as to the need for such a measure, urging that only
a national law could effectively deal with the problems of fraudu-
lent remedies and impure and adulterated food and drugs. How-
ever, even though Dr. Wiley attempted to arouse the public by his
speeches and writings, it seems unlikely that this alone would have
3. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1970).
4. This early legislation was primarily concerned with the taxation and regulation of
imports so as to protect the young American food and drug industries from destructive
foreign competition. Most of these laws dealt with foods; however, one law passed in 1848
provided for the examination of all imported drugs, medicines, and medicinal preparations
as to their purity and fitness and as to their value and identity as described in the accompa-
nying literature. I H. TOULMIN, THE LAW OF FOODS, DRUGS AND COSMETIcs § 1.3 (2d
ed. 1963).
5. Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768. This Act is popularly referred to as the
"Wiley Pure Food and Drugs Act," since it was passed largely due to the efforts of Dr.
Harvey W.Wiley, who became chief chemist of the Department of Agriculture in 1883 and
had a consuming passion to eliminate impure and adulterated food from the American
marketplace. See J. YOUNG, The Medical Messiahs, in THE LAWLESS CENTURIES (1967).
This work also tells of the patent medicine abuses, which were the other primary evil the
1906 Act was intended to curb.
6. 1 H. TOULMIN, supra note 4, at § 1.3.
7. See note 5 supra. For a good biography of Dr. Wiley, see 0. ANDERSON, THE
HEALTH OF A NATION: HARVEY W. WILEY AND THE FIGHT FOR PURE FOOD (1958).
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been enough to overcome the even then very strong food and drug
lobbies; had it not been for the public impact of Upton Sinclair's
The Jungle, with its description of the horrors of the American
meat processing industry at that time, the bill might not have
passed. The resulting public outrage was the additional impetus
required to make Wiley's goal of a national pure food and drug
law become a reality.
Although the 1906 Act was a significant step forward in con-
sumer protection, it soon became evident that it had its shortcom-
ings, which grew more serious as the economy continued to develop
and the food and drug industries continued to expand. Amend-
ments were added through the years,8 but it was apparent that there
was needed a new statute which would incorporate the still useful
provisions of the 1906 Act, while adding new provisions to deal
with problems that were either not regulated at all or were not
effectively regulated by it. Also, it was simply not feasible to at-
tempt to adjust to the profound changes in commercial and manu-
facturing conditions that had occurred in the food and drug indus-
tries during the first third of the twentieth century by the method
of piecemeal amendments
Again it was demonstrated that food and drug legislation is not
easy to enact. By the 1930's, the food and drug industries had
become even more powerful, and they were quick to exercise their
lobbying power when any further governmental regulation was
suggested. The first bill embodying the proposed new legislation
was introduced by Senator Royal S. Copeland on June 6, 1933,11
but it was not until more than five years later, on June 25, 1938,
that the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act finally became
law."
8. See I H. TOULMIN, supra note 4, at § 1.4. These amendments are summarized in
U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION (1931).
9. See S. REP. No. 493, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). S. 2800 was one of the earlier
unsuccessful versions of what was to become the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of
1938.
10. S. 1944, 73d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1933-34). This bill was prepared in the Depart-
ment of Agriculture after President Roosevelt had authorized a revision of the Federal Food
and Drugs Act of 1906. S. 1944 was prepared in that department because the Department
of Agriculture was responsible for the enforcement of the 1906 Act. The Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) was first provided for by the Agriculture Appropriation Act of 1931,
46 Stat. 392. The FDA is now part of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.
It was made a part of the Consumer Protection and Environmental Health Service created
by the Secretary's reorganization on July 1, 1968. The FDA is responsible for the enforce-
ment of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as amended.
I1. Five bills, all sponsored by Senator Copeland, were introduced in the Senate during
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The Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906 had not regulated
medical devices at all.12 This was one of the defects sought to be
corrected by the new legislation. 13 Also, although the 1906 Act
had regulated drugs, in that it was unlawful to manufacture drugs
which were adulterated or misbranded, it did not in any way re-
quire that new drugs be tested prior to marketing." Moreover,
while medical devices were, for the first time, included insofar as
adulteration and misbranding were concerned, none of the earlier
versions of the 1938 Act's required premarket clearance of either
new drugs or new devices.
Once again it took a shocking event to enable this glaring gap
to be plugged, and unfortunately it was plugged only with respect
to new drugs. In 1937, a Tennessee pharmaceutical company mar-
keted a liquid preparation of sulfanilamide, a newly developed
"wonder' drug proven valuable in the treatment of infections when
the course of the legislative battle. The first two-S. 1944, 73d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1933-
34), the original bill, and S. 2000, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), which superseded S.
1944-died in committee. S. 2800, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), which superseded S. 2000,
died on the Senate Calendar. S. 5, 74th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1935-36), which succeeded
S. 2800, passed the Senate but was defeated in the House. Finally, S. 5, 75th Cong., Ist &
3d Sess. (1937-38), which succeeded S. 2800, passed the Senate but was defeated in the
House. Finally, S. 5, 75th Cong., 1st & 3d Sess. (1937-38), which succeeded the first S. 5,
was enacted, as supplemented by the provisions of S. 3073,75th Cong., 2d & 3d Sess. (1937-
38) and H.R. 9341, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) (companion bill to S. 3073), the so-called
"sulfanilamide bills." The lengthy history of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of
1938 is collected in C. DUNN, FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT-A STATEMENT
OF ITS LEGISLATIVE RECORD 23 (1938).
One of the most hotly contested issues during this long battle was the question of which
agency should have control over food, drug, and cosmetic advertising-the FDA or the FTC
(Federal Trade Commission). Jurisdiction over this area was eventually given to the FTC.
12. The 1906 Act also did not regulate cosmetics, unless the representations made for
the cosmetic brought it within the "drug" definition. For a summary of the chief differences
between the Acts of 1906 and 1938, see 1 H. TOULMIN, supra note 4, at § 2.3.
13. As the FDA warned:
Mechanical devices, represented as helpful in the cure of disease, may be harmful.
Many of them serve a useful and definite purpose. The weak and ailing furnish a
fertile field, however, for mechanical devices represented as potent in the treatment
of many conditions for which there is no effective mechanical cure. The need for legal
control of devices of this type is self-evident. Products and devices intended to effect
changes in the physical structure of the body not necessarily associated with disease
are extremely prevalent and, some instances, capable of extreme harm. They are at
this time almost wholly beyond the control of any Federal statute. . . .The new
statute, if enacted, will bring such products under the jurisdiction of the Law.
U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION 13-14 (1933).
14. The Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906 is reprinted in C. DUNN, supra note 11,
at 1336-43.
15. See note 11 supra.
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administered in tablet or powder form. In response to the demand
for a liquid preparation, this company developed one using diethy-
lene glycol as a solvent, since sulfanilamide was insoluble in the
liquids commonly used in making liquid drug preparations. The
resulting "Elixir Sulfanilamide" was put on the market without
conducting tests as to its safety. Diethylene glycol proved to be
highly toxic when ingested. In the six weeks before the company
began recalling the product at the insistence of the Food and Drug
Administration (hereinafter FDA), seventy-three persons died as a
direct result of taking the drug, and twenty others who took it died,
but it was not definitely established that the drug was the exclusive
cause of death. The FDA quickly seized or otherwise accounted for
virtually the entire amount of "Elixir" that had been manufac-
tured-240 gallons.
The public outrage generated by this tragedy was so great that
the Senate requested the Department of Agriculture to conduct a
study of the entire affair." The report, 7 submitted to Congress by
the Secretary of Agriculture, disclosed the utter inadequacy of the
1906 Act to prevent such a disaster 8 and recommended enactment
of at least minimal remedial legislation.'9 In fact, it was only due
to a fortuitous technicality that the FDA was able to assume juris-
diction at all. 20 Indeed, the manufacturer-who paid a fine of
16. S. Rep. 194, 75th Cong., 2d Sess., 82 CONG. REc. 25 (1937).
17. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE ON DEATHS DUE TO ELIXIR
SULFANILAMIDE-MASSENGILL, S. Doc. No. 124, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1937).
18. As the report indicated:
Before the "elixir" was put on the market, it was tested by the firm for flavor but
not for its effect on human life! The existing Food and Drugs Act does not require
that new drugs be tested before they are placed on sale.
The fatal "elixir" was rushed onto the market without adequate tests to deter-
mine whether or not diethylene glycol may be safely used as a solvent for sulfanilam-
ide, despite previously published reports in scientific literature showing that diethy-
lene glycol might be dangerous when taken internally. A few simple and inexpensive
tests on experimental animals would have quickly demonstrated the toxic properties
of both diethylene glycol and the "elixir."
Id. 1-2.
19. In the words of the report:
To protect the public from drugs which, like the "elixir," are dangerous because
of their inherent toxicity, it is the Department's recommendation that legislation be
enacted to provide at least the following:
1. License control of new drugs to insure that they will not be generally distrib-
uted until experimental and clinical tests have shown them to be safe for use.
Id. 9-10.
20. As the report disclosed:
Since the Federal Food and Drugs Act contains no provision against dangerous drugs,
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$26,100, the highest levied under the 1906 Act-denied any
wrongdoing or responsibility. 21 However, the chemist who con-
cocted the "Elixir" committed suicide.2
As a result of the Secretary's report and the public reaction to
the events comprising its subject matter, bills were introduced in
both houses of Congress requiring FDA approval before a new
drug could be marketed in interstate commerce.23 The provisions
of these bills were incorporated into the then pending Senate Bill
5,24 which was subsequently enacted, in its supplemented form, as
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938.5
A drug was a "new drug" as defined by section 201(p)26 of the
original 1938 Act and, therefore, subject to the premarket clear-
ance requirement in the original section 505(a)2 only if it was not
generally recognized by qualified experts as safe for use as pre-
scribed by its labeling. The Kefauver-Harris Drug Amendments of
19622 amended section 201(p) so as to provide that a drug is a
"new drug" if it is not generally recognized by qualified experts as
safe and effective for use under the conditions prescribed in its
labeling.29 The '"grandfather clause"-that is, the exemption appl-
seizures had to be based on a charge that the word "elixir" implies an alcoholic solution,
whereas this product was a diethylene glycol solution. Had the product been called a
"solution," rather than an "elixir," no charge of violating the law could have been brought.
Id. 1.
21. Id. 9.
22. K. CRAWFORD, THE PREssURE Boys 73 (1939).
23. These were the so-called "sulfanilamide bills." See note 11 supra.
24. 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937). See note 11 supra.
25. Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1041. For an extensive discussion of the 1938
Act, see Developments in the Law-The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 67 HARV.
L. REv. 632 (1954).
26. 52 Stat. 1041-42 (1938).
27. Id. at 1052.
28. Act of Oct. 10, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780.
29. As a result of section 102(a)(l) & (2) of the Amendments, section 2 01(p) of the Act
was changed to read:
The term "new drug" means-
(1) Any drug the composition of which is such that such drug is not generally
recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate
the safety and effectiveness of drugs, as safe and effective for use under the conditions
prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof, except that such a
drug not so recognized shall not be deemed to be a "new drug" if at any time prior
to the enactment of this Act it was subject to the Food and Drugs Act of June 30,
1906, as amended, and if at such time its labeling contained the same representations
concerning the conditions of its use; or
(2) Any drug the composition of which is such that such drug, as a result of
investigations to determine its safety and effectiveness for use under such conditions,
has become so recognized, but which has not, otherwise than in such investigations,
1972]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
icable to drugs previously subject to the 1906 Act providing no
change was made in the representations in their labeling-was
continued. Section 505(a) was also amended31 to make it explicit
that it was unlawful to market a "new drug" unless the FDA had
first approved a new drug application, which was to supply the
information and samples required by section 505(b).3 1
The 1962 Amendments once more demonstrated that it re-
quired a shocking and well-publicized threat to public health and
safety to secure enactment of major food and drug legislation. The
Thalidomide tragedy that occurred in Europe in 1961 and early
1962, in which thousands of babies were born with monstrous
deformities (phocomelia) caused by their mother's exposure to the
drug during pregnancy, aroused world-wide public concern. For-
tunately, the new drug application submitted to the FDA by the
prospective United States distributor of the drug was never ap-
proved, so Thalidomide was never marketed commercially in this
country.32 Even so, the public clamor for additional safeguards
been used to a material extent or for a material time under such conditions.
21 U.S.C. § 3 2 1(p) (1970). The Animal Drug Amendments of 1968 (Pub. L. No. 90-399)
amended both subsections by inserting, after the words "Any drug," the parenthetical
language, "(except a new animal drug or an animal feed bearing or containing a new animal
drug)."
30. As a result of section 104(a) of the Amendments, section 505(a) of the Act was
amended to read:
No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate commerce
any new drug, unless an approval of an application filed pursuant to subsection (b)
is effective with respect to such drug.
This section remains substantially unchanged in its present official form. 21
U.S.C. § 355(a) (1970).
31. This section now provides:
Any person may file with the Secretary an application with respect to any drug
subject to the provisions of subsection (a) of this section. Such person shall submit
to the Secretary as a part of the application (I) full reports of investigations which
have been made to show whether or not such drug is safe for use and whether such
drug is effective in use; (2) a full list of the articles used as components of such drug;
(3) a full statement of the composition of such drug; (4) a full description of the
methods used in, and the facilities and controls used for, the manufacture, process-
ing, and packing of such drugs; (5) such samples of such drug and of the articles used
as components thereof as the Secretary may require; and (6) specimens of the label-
ing proposed to be used for such drug.
21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1970).
32. The FDA physician to whom the new drug application was assigned did not believe
that the evidence submitted sufficiently demonstrated that Thalidomide was safe. She was
particularly concerned about possible effects on the fetus and, therefore, withheld approval
despite vigorous entreaties by the prospective distributor. When the horrible effects of the
drug became known, the application was withdrawn. S. REP. No. 1744, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
40-42 (1962). See also R. HARRIS, THE REAL VOICE 184-93 (1964) and J. YOUNG, supra
note 5, at 415-18.
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was so great that Congress quickly responded by passing the 1962
Amendments, which, in addition to adding the "effectiveness" re-
quirement for "new drugs," substantially broadened the FDA's
regulatory power over both prescription and over-the-counter
drugs in several other significant respects. 3
II. ORIGINS OF THE DEFINITIONAL DILEMMA 34
In the 1906 Act the term "drug" was defined so as to
include all medicines and preparations recognized in the United
States Pharmacopoeia or National Formulary for internal or
external use, and any substance or mixture of substances in-
tended to be used for the cure, mitigation, or prevention of dis-
ease in man or other animals.3 1
Medical devices were not included in either this definition or any
other provision. This lack of control over medical devices was
recognized as one of the major defects in the 1906 Act, indicating
the need for more comprehensive legislation.36
In Senate Bill 1944, ' the first of the bills introduced to replace
the 1906 Act, the term "drug" was defined so as to include all
"devices intended for use in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or
prevention of disease in man or other animals," and "all devices,
intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man
or other animals."3 The term "cosmetic" was separately de-
Although Thalidomide was never marketed commercially in the United States, there
was a limited distribution for investigational use only. For a discussion of the civil liability
of the manufacturer for the birth defects that did result in the United States and in the
Commonwealth countries, see Bennett, The Liability of the Manufacturers of Thalidomide
to the Affected Children, 39 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 256 (1965).
33. S. 1552, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), the bill which was eventually enacted, origi-
nally arose out of the 1959-60 Kefauver hearings on price regulation in the drug industry.
Ftr a summary of the ways in which the 1962 Amendments differed from the existing law,
see 3 H. ToULMIN, supra note 4, at § 53.1, and for a section-by-section summary of the
changes effected by them, see this same work at § 53.44.
34. See Styn, A Dichotomy in Consumer Protection-The Drug-Device Definition
Dilemma, 44 INDIANA L.J. 503 (1969). The author of this article is a former trial attorney
in the General Counsel's Office, U.S. Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare, Food and
Drug Division. For a good artirle dealing with the present definitional problems of the 1938
Act, see Weitzman, Drug, Device, Cosmetic? (pts. 1 & 2), 24 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 226,
320 (1969).
35. C. DUNN, supra note 11, at 1338.
36. See note 13 supra. See also REPORT OF THE CHEMIST, ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE
U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE 210-18 (1917).
37. See notes 10 & 11 supra.
38. C. DUNN, supra note 11, at 37.
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fined.39 In the Senate hearings on this bill, Walter Campbell, then
Chief of the Food and Drug Administration, Department of Agri-
culture, stated that the word "device" was intended to extend the
scope of the law to include not only products like sutures and
surgical dressings, but also "trusses or any other mechanical appli-
ance that might be employed for the treatment of disease or in-
tended for the cure or mitigation or prevention of disease."40 Mr.
Campbell also indicated that the definition of "drug"-with de-
vices subsumed thereunder-was "admittedly an inclusive, a wide
definition."'" The purpose of this part of the definition was to reach
products that could not be alleged to be treatments for diseased
conditions, such as "antifat remedies," "nose straighteners," and
"heightening devices. '42
When Senate Bill 1944 was superseded by Senate Bill 2000, the
definition of "drug" was amended to include substances and prepa-
rations recognized in the Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the
United States, but was otherwise unchanged.13 Similarly, when
this latter bill was superseded by Senate Bill 2800, there was no
material change in the definition of "drug. '44
Since it was the use or intended use of a product which deter-
mined into which classification it fell-so that if the uses or in-
tended uses fell within two classifications, the product would be
subject to the substantive provisions of both-the report of the
Committee on Commerce, accompanying the bill, stated that the
definitions of "food," "drug," and "cosmetic" should not be con-
strued as mutually exclusive. The report also indicated that the
express provision to that effect in the definition of "cosmetic" in
Senate Bill 1944 was deleted because it was superfluous in view of
the fact that there had never been a court decision holding that the
definitions of "food" and "drug" under the 1906 Act were mu-
tually exclusive, despite repeated cases where prosecutions were
brought on the basis that a product was both a "food" and a
"drug.945
Industry opposition caused Senate Bill 2800 to die on the Sen-
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1053.
41. Id. This comment refers to that part of the definition which relates to devices
"intended to affect the structure or any function." See note 38 and accompanying text
supra.
42. Id. 1053-54.
43. Id. 52.
44. Id. 72.
45. S. REP. No. 493, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. (1934).
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ate Calendar," but it was reintroduced in the 74th Congress as the
first Senate Bill 5.47 The definitions of "drug" and "cosmetic" were
not changed.18 However, during the course of the Senate hearings,
Mr. Campbell was again called to testify, and he submitted a
statement in which he again said-apparently in response to criti-
cism-that the definition of "drug" was intentionally very broad,
since this was necessary to effect the purpose of reaching therapeu-
tic devices in the absence of a separate definition of the term,
"device." 49
In the Senate debate on this bill, Senator Clark addressed a
question to Senator Copeland, inquiring about the incongruity of
including purely mechanical devices under the definition of
"drug." Senator Clark stated that he had no objection to the inclu-
sion of devices in the proposed legislation, but that to maintain that
a purely mechanical device was a drug and should be treated as a
drug "in law and in logic and in lexicography is a palpable absurd-
ity." At this time Senator Copeland was actually discussing an-
other matter-an amendment to add the word "diagnosis" to the
definition of "drug" 5"-but he digressed to indicate that he would
46. Attempting to pinpoint the cause of its demise, the Chief of the FDA wrote:
In spite of material public support, this measure, as was to be expected, aroused
bitter opposition from certain trade elements, particularly the proprietary-medicine
industry and sections of the advertising profession which saw in the passage of such
legislation a curb on lucrative practices heretofore indulged in with impunity. A vast
amount of misinformation to the effect that the bill if passed would result in destruc-
tion of legitimate industries, interfere with the right of self-medication, and deny
manufacturers their constitutional rights, was disseminated not only among the in-
dustries but among the public. A flood of bills purporting to accomplish the same
purposes was introduced with the undoubted result of effectively confusing the issue.
While all of them extended somewhat the scope of the present statute, the restrictions
of some on regulatory action would have effectually nullified many of the provisions
of the present law now potent for public protection. Trade opposition, together with
the congested congressional legislative program, was largely responsible for the fail-
ure of Congress to take action.
U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINIS-
TRATION 15 (1934).
47. See note 11 supra.
48. C. DUNN, supra note 11, at 192.
49. On this subject, one author wrote:
There is a universal recognition that the definition of the term "drug" in the third
subdivision is inclusive. This fact was admitted at the hearing on S. 1944. To provide
for jur;odiction over the innumerable devices to which therapeutic virtues are as-
cribed, it will be necessary either to operate under a definition of this character, as
incongruous as it is, or to set up, as proposed by one witness, an independent
paragraph relating to therapeutic devices.
Id. 1223.
50. By way of amendment, Senator Copeland sought to include in the definition of
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not object to the separate definition of the terms "drug" and "de-
vice." Senator Clark again interrupted to press his objection while
Senator Copeland continued to talk about the other amendment,
which was the topic actually under discussion and which was then
approved by the Senate.51
However, Senator Clark's position as to the definitions eventu-
ally prevailed. Devices were removed from the "drug" definition,
and a separate definition of "device" was added.52 The word "diag-
nosis" was included in the "device" definition, and also remained
in the "drug" definition, even though the original purpose for its
inclusion was to reach diagnostic devices. Senate Bill 5 was then
passed by the Senate in its amended form and referred to the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, where
hearings were held. During the course of these hearings, Mr.
Campbell explained that the reason for the separate definition of
device was merely to eliminate the incongruity of classifying cer-
tain purely mechanical devices as "drugs. 5 3 Although the House
did not disagree with the Senate definitions, it believed that the
Federal Trade Commission, not the FDA, should have jurisdiction
over false advertising of drugs, devices, and cosmetics.54 For this
reason, Senate Bill 5 failed to pass the House.
The second Senate Bill 5 having been introduced in the next
session, the Senate made some immaterial changes in the defini-
tions of "drug," "device," and "cosmetic." 56 The House, however,
revised the bill by adopting the definitions of "drug," "device,"
and "cosmetic" utilized in its version of Senate Bill 1077,' 7 the bill
"drug" all "substances, preparations, and devices intended for use in the diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals." 79 CONG. REC.
4845 (1935) (emphasis added).
5 1. For a fuller discussion of this Copeland-Clark dialogue, see Weitzman, supra note
34, at 236-38. The complete transcript embodying this interchange is reprinted in C. DUNN,
supra note 1I, at 286-300.
52. C. DUNN, supra note 11, at 496.
53. Recognizing this, one author wrote:
The purpose of the third subdivision is to provide for "devices." Originally this
definition of "drugs" also included devices, such as mechanical applicances and
contraptions which are to be found without number. But the incongruity of classify-
ing certain devices, such as the electric belt, therapeutic lamps, and so forth, as drugs
was pointed out by the Senate in the last consideration of the bill. They felt it proper
to provide an independent definition of "devices."
C. DUNN, supra note II, at 1247.
54. See note II supra.
55. Id.
56. C. DUNN, supra note 11, at 658 & 696.
57. 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (1937).
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which became the Wheeler-Lea Act and which gave the FTC con-
trol over the advertising of drugs, devices, and cosmetics."8 These
definitions substituted by the House survived the subsequent events
and are the definitions in effect59 at the present time.
Although the supplementation of Senate Bill 5 by addition of
the "new drug" provisions as a result of the "Elixir Sulfanilamide"
disaster" did not alter the definitions of "drug," "device," or "cos-
metic," the addition of these provisions did have a very significant
consequence with regard to the respective substantive regulation of
"drugs" and "devices."
Since the premarket approval requirement of section 505(a) 2
applied only to a "new drug," and a "new drug" was defined as
58. When S. 1077 was first introduced in the House, it contained the same definitions
as the Senate version of S. 5. However, the version of S. 1077 which was enacted changed
the definitions by substituting "article" for "substances and preparations" in the definition
of "drug;" substituting "instruments, apparatus and contrivances" in place of "devices" in
the definition of "device;" and adding a phrase excluding "devices or their components,
parts, or accessories" from the definition of "drug." See notes 38, 50, & 52 supra. The
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce then revised S. 5 by adopting the
definitions of "drug," "device," and "cosmetic" from its version of S. 1077. See Weitzman,
supra note 34, at 240 & 245, and C. DUNN, supra note 11, at 753.
59. The relevant subsections of 21 U.S.C. § 321 (1970) provide:
(g)(1) The term "drug" means (A) articles recognized in the official United
States Pharmacopeia, official Homeopathic Pharmacopeia of the United States, or
official National Formulary, or any supplement to any of them; and (B) articles
intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease
in man or other animals; and (C) articles (other than food) intended to affect the
structure or any function of the body of man or other animals; and (D) articles
intended for use as a component of any article specified in clauses (A), (B), or (C)
of this paragraph; but does not include devices or their components, parts, or acces-
sories.
(h) The term "device" (except when used in paragraph (n) of this section and
in sections 331(i), 343(f), 352(c), and 362(c) of this title means instruments, appara-
tus, and contrivances, including their components, parts, and accessories, intended
(1) for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in
man or other animals; or (2) to affect the structure or any function of the body of
man or other animals.
(i) The term "cosmetic" means (1) articles intended to be rubbed, poured,
sprinkled, or sprayed on, introduced into, or otherwise applied to the human body
or any part thereof for cleansing, beautifying, promoting attractiveness, or altering
the appearance, and (2) articles intended for use as a component of any such articles;
except that such term shall not include soap.
60. The only differences in the present definitions from the definitions in the House
version of S. 5 are the addition of the word "components" to the definition of "device,"
and the use of letters in place of numbers to denote the subdivisions of the definition of
"drug."
61. See notes 16-31 and accompanying text supra.
62. Note 30 supra.
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"any drug," 3 the separate definition of "device" now took on a
significance far beyond that of merely eliminating a semantic in-
congruity. In fact, the result was a far more serious incongruity in
that, although one of the major purposes of the new legislation was
to bring devices under federal regulation to the same degree as
drugs, the act of removing devices from within the "drug" defini-
tion had now created an extreme dichotomy between the substan-
tive regulation of "drugs" and "devices." Because of their separate
definition, new "devices" were not subject to the premarket ap-
proval requirements thought essential for the protection of the
public with respect to "new drugs," even though such devices were
originally included within the definition of "drug" because of the
similar dangers they presented. Thus, if devices had not been made
the subject of a separate definition, they too would have been
subject to the premarket clearance requirement, since they would
have been "drugs" within the "new drug" definition. Until the
addition of the "new drug" provisions, drugs and devices were
subject to the same extent of regulation under the proposed legisla-
tion, both before and after the separate definition of "device."
However, after the addition of the "new drug" provisions, by virtue
of the now significant separate definition of "device," the regula-
ton of devices was vastly less stringent than the regulation of drugs.
There is nothing apparent in the legislative history to indicate
Congress was even aware of this anomalous result, much less that
it was intended. It seems quite possible that the creation of this
dichotomy was inadvertent, the combined effect of the various
amendments simply never having been considered. Of course, it is
also possible that the present dichotomy is precisely what was
intended and that there would have been objections had the final
version of the bill explicitly required premarket clearance of de-
vices. However, in view of the closeness in time of the critical
amendments, the overwhelming public pressure demanding that
some law be enacted immediately, the totally non-substantive rea-
son for the separate definition of "device," and the previously
similar modes of proposed regulation, it seems fair to say that the
resulting absence of premarket clearance regulation for new de-
vices was probably due to oversight and unfortunate coincidence
rather than to a considered decision.
To further compound the confusion-and the irrationality-of
63. Note 29 supra.
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this situation, the definitions of "drug" and "device" are in part
identical, except that "drugs" are "articles intended for use in the
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in
man or other animals," or "articles (other than food) intended to
affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other
animals," 4 while "devices" are
instruments, apparatus, and contrivances . . . intended (1) for
use in the diagnosis; cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention
of disease in man or other animals; or (2) to affect the structure
or any function of the body of man or other animals. 5
Thus, an "article" is subject to premarket approval by the FDA,
while an "instrument, apparatus, or contrivance" is not.
The question then becomes, what is the difference between an
"article" and an "instrument, apparatus, or contrivance?" The
answer to this question is not obvious, to say the least!
Since the premarket approval requirement is a significant ob-
stacle to the marketing of a new product in terms of both time and
expense, even the most legitimate manufacturer will try to avoid
this hurdle if he possibly can. The express exclusion of "devices or
their components, parts, or accessories" from the definition of
"drug" aids evasion of the premarket approval requirement, since
this language literally permits no other construction than that a
product which is a "device" cannot also be a "drug.""6 Thus, the
categories of "drug'; and "device" certainly seem to be mutually
exclusive, 7 both because of the express exclusion and because of
the fact that classification vis-a-vis the categories of "drug" and
64. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (1970). See note 59 supra.
65. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (1970) (emphasis added). See note 59 supra.
66. Compare with text at note 45 supra.
67. One writer, in explaining the definition sections of the 1938 Act, originally believed
it to be "clear that the categories 'food,' 'drug,' 'device,' and 'cosmetic' should not be denied
as mutually exclusive." I H. TOULMIN, supra note 4, at § 4.15. However, in view of the
express exclusion of devices from the definition of the term, "drug," this same writer, by
way of supplement, revised his earlier statement, noting that items subject to the device
definition "would appear to be excluded totally from drug classification." Id. (Supp. 1969).
An argument might be made that the word, "devices," as used in the exclusionary
clause, does not mean "devices" as defined in section 201(h), since "device" in section
201(h) is in quotation marks and the word "devices" in the exclusionary clause is not.
However, this argument would seem to be foreclosed by the language in parentheses in
section 201(h), which says that device means "device" as defined in section 201(h) except
when used in certain enumerated sections. Section 201(g)(1), which defines "drug," is not
one of the sections enumerated; thus, the word "device" as used therein means "device" as
defined by section 201(h).
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"device" is no longer determined by intended use." Rather, as
between these two categories, classification is determined by the
inherent nature of the product, since the respective "intended for
use" clauses are identical and are reached only after a determina-
tion is made as to whether a product is an "article" or an "instru-
ment, apparatus, or contrivance." Once this elusive determination
as to inherent nature is made, the product, if determined to be a
"device," is expressly excluded from the "drug" definition and is
therefore not subject to premarket clearance. Thu , the manufac-
turer of a product that could fit under either definition has a very
strong incentive to maintain that his product is a "device" and,
therefore, not a "drug"-and that it can, thus, be marketed with-
out first having to prove to the FDA's satisfaction that it is safe
and effective for the use recommended.
Moreover, while the definitions in the Senate version of the bill
had begun, "The term 'drug' includes" and "The term 'device'
includes"6"-thus permitting the construction that the enumerated
classes of items only constituted examples of some of the catego-
ries of products which fell within the definitions and that other
items could also fall within them-the definitions finally adopted
read, "The term 'drug' means" and "The term 'device' means,''70
thus implying that only products which fall within the classes enu-
merated are within the respective definitions, and other items are
not.
A further consideration of the legislative history makes this
regulatory dichotomy even more perplexing. As has been indi-
cated, the provisions of Senate Bill 3073 and House Bill 9341 were
incorporated into the pending Senate Bill 5 to comprise the "new
drug" provisions.7' While the preamble of the House bill paralleled
that of the Senate version, the House bill varied from the Senate
bill in that it contained a different definition of "drug" for the
purpose of the premarket clearance requirement." Under that defi-
nition, a "drug" that had to be precleared was defined as an "arti-
68. See text immediately following note 44 supra.
69. C. DUNN, supra note 11, at 638 (emphasis added).
70. See note 59 supra (emphasis added).
71. See note 11 supra and note 24 and accompanying text supra.
72. H.R. 9341, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. § 8(c) (1938):
The term "drug" means (1) articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals; and (2)
articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body
of man or other animals.
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cle," rather than as "any drug"-which is the language used to
define "new drug" in the provisions eventually adopted and still in
force.73 Had the House bill been enacted as a separate measure,
its definition might have been construed as broad enough to require
preclearance of devices as well.74 However, when consolidated with
the other provisions of Senate Bill 5, even if the House's special
definition of "drug" had been used instead of the "new drug"
definition actually adopted, it would seem that the preclearance
requirement still could not have been construed as reaching de-
vices. The House Bill 9341 "drug" definition was identical with
subdivisions (B) and (C) of the amended Senate Bill 5 "drug"
definition,75 so that the only "articles" subject to preclearance
would have been those falling within the Senate Bill 5 "drug"
definition. The result would have, thus, been that "devices" would
still not have been covered. In any event, because the House defini-
tion was not used, this speculation is moot.
It is an understatement to say that the final version of Senate
Bill 5, which became the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
on June 25, 1938, was fraught with complications, implications,
and loopholes. Surprisingly, the courts have not had to squarely
face these problems until quite recently, although the absence of
premarket approval regulation with respect to medical devices has
been the subject of as yet unfruitful legislative concern for some
time. Before considering the recent judicial decisions and the past
and presently pending proposed corrective legislation, it would
seem appropriate to explore the magnitude and seriousness of the
problems presented by medical devices in the absence of any pre-
market clearance requirement or federal standards.
III. PROBLEMS IN THE ABSENCE OF PREMARKET APPROVAL AND
FEDERAL STANDARDS
Essentially there are two broad classes of "medical" devices
from which the present problems emanate. The problems presented
by each class are substantially different, which suggests that they
might require different solutions or might not be equally amenable
to the same solution. Both by virtue of the different essential nature
of each class of devices and the different problems each presents,
it is appropriate to consider the classes separately.
73. Note 29 supra.
74. See Weitzman, supra note 34, at 247-48.
75. This is the present 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (1970). See note 59 supra.
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The first class is comprised of devices manufactured, used or
sold by medical quacks. It is misleading even to call these devices
"medical" devices, since they usually have no medical value at all.
However, though not normally helpful, these devices are also not
usually intrinsically harmful. The dangers they present lie in the
fact that they are purported to alleviate or cure conditions for
which there is as yet no successful legitimate medical treatment or
for which the recognized treatment is drastic (i.e. surgery or radia-
tion). Thus, these devices appeal to the victims of such condi-
tions-like cancer and arthritis-who are willing to pursue any
alternative in their desperation. Pain, suffering, and an outlook of
hopelessness can easily overshadow rationality and cause the suf-
ferer to be vulnerable to representations that he would otherwise
deem absurd. Also, the quacks use science to enhance faith in their
devices by comparing them to legitimate medical devices.
Where there is a recognized treatment-and assuming the de-
vice is not inherently harmful-these quack devices result in harm
indirectly by causing their users to delay seeking the recognized
treatment, thus allow ng their conditions to worsen, often until it
is too late for legitimate medicine to help. In any event, whether
these quack devices merely have no effect at all, or are directly or
indirectly harmful, they are a source of great profit to the quacks
who promote them-a profit which is usually derived from those
who can least afford to pay.
The other class is that of the devices made by legitimate manu-
facturers. These devices have recognized medical value, but often
are not as safe or effective as they could be in light of present
knowledge. Paradoxically, the harm resulting from these legiti-
mate devices is often direct, in the sense that the resultant damage
is due directly to the use of the device. However, it is also possible
for these devices to cause indirect harm in that another mode of
treatment which otherwise would have been used might have been
safer or more effective. Devices within this broad category of legiti-
mate devices are usually manufactured and distributed in large
numbers, and are widely used by legitimate hospitals and medical
practitioners. The problems presented by these devices-which can
truly be called "medical" devices-ordinarily arise not from the
fraudulent intent of the manufacturer or distributor, but from a
lack of standards as to quality, uniformity, and performance, and
a lack of adequate premarket testing under actual conditions of
use.
As has already been indicated, there is no requirement under
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present federal law that a "device" be proved safe and effective for
its intended use before it may be marketed in interstate com-
merce." Putting aside temporarily the definitional difficulties pre-
viously discussed, and before considering recent judicial decisions,
a brief review of some of the past and present problems involving
nmedical devices of both the quack and legitimate varieties will help
in analyzing the present situation and the need for and wisdom of
the proposed solutions.
A. Device Quackery
It is unfortunate, but true, that advances in science and technol-
ogy have been and still are capitalized on by charlatans who pro-
mote fantastic devices purportedly operating upon accepted scien-
tific principles. Thus, while the early quack devices in this country
were represented to be based on theories of magnetism and elec-
tromagnetism, the development of the utility of electricity was
paralleled by a proliferation of diagnostic and therapeutic devices
which were alleged to apply the emerging body of electrical and
electronic knowledge to the field of medicine. Because these new
devices were advertised as being highly scientific and technical, it
was natural that self-healing was replaced by a norm in which
supposedly learned practitioners operated these various devices,
often in their own "clinic," where patients would come for treat-
ment. These quack practitioners analogized their fantastic ma-
chines to such legitimate devices as the X-ray instrument and the
electrocardiograph, and purported to be able to diagnose and treat
virtually any and all ills. After World War II, there was an increase
in device quackery due to the cheap availability of war surplus
electrical and electronic equipment.
Because many of these devices were being used by licensed
practitioners-such as chiropractors, osteopaths, and medical doc-
tors-it was difficult to deal with the problems presented by such
devices once they were on the market. The traditional right of a
doctor to be free to exercise his judgment as to the best treatment
for his patients was not to be transgressed lightly. Unfortunately,
this "right" of the legitimate practitioner was being effectively
used as a shield by many licensed quacks. 71
76. The scope of this article does not include a consideration of state laws dealing with
the regulation of medical devices. Due to the national character of the market, it would seem
that only federal regulation could effectively cope with the interstate problems presented.
77. See J. YOUNG, supra note 5, at 242-45.
1972]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
The general nature of the problems presented by quack devices
is dramatically illustrated by the case of the "Drown Radio Thera-
peutic Instrument." This device was simply a little black box with
several dials on it which did absolutely nothing. The only operative
part was a simple galvanometric circuit which the "patient" com-
pleted by placing his or her feet on one dissimilar metal and hold-
ing another to the skin of his or her abdomen. This device was
manufactured and promoted by a "self-taught" woman chiroprac-
tor and was reputed to be able to diagnose and treat virtually any
disease merely from analysis of a single drop of the "patient's"
blood. It was not even necessary that the "patient" have direct
access to the machine, since the treatment could just as well be
conducted from afar via "radio waves."
The incident which finally brought Mrs. Drown to trial in-
volved a woman with breast cancer who delayed surgery in reliance
on the healing powers of Mrs. Drown's fraudulent machine until
her condition was inoperable and death inevitable. Proceeding on
the ground that the device was "misbranded, ' ' 8 the FDA suc-
ceeded in winning a verdict against Mrs. Drown, which was sus-
tained on appeal.79 However, the resulting $1,000 fine was little
more than a slap on the wrist to Mrs. Drown, and she continued
to ply her trade, merely being careful to avoid interstate distribu-
tion of her devices so as to evade federal jurisdiction.80 The cost of
the case to the government was conservatively estimated at
$50,000, and it was brought and won only with very great difficulty.
Mrs. Drown had been under surveillance for some time before the
opportunity arose for the FDA to successfully seize one of her
devices, file a libel of information against it, and have it con-
demned by the court.8'
By making minor changes in models, a seizure action can be
frustrated. Further, in such an action, the burden of proof is on the
78. 21 U.S.C. § 331 (a) (1970) prohibits "[tihe introduction or delivery for introduction
into interstate commerce of any. . . device. . . that is adulterated or misbranded." Under
21 U.S.C. § 331(c) (1970), the receipt in interstate commerce and the delivery of such a
device are prohibited. Further, 21 U.S.C. § 331(b) (1970) prohibits the adulteration or
misbrading of any device in interstate commerce. The circumstances under which a drug
or device will be deemed misbranded are defined in 21 U.S.C. § 352 (1970).
79. Drwon v. United States, 198 F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 920
(1953).
80. For a fuller discussion of the Drown case and a brief history of device quackery in
general, see J. YOUNG, supra note 5, at ch. 11.
81. The procedure to be followed for purposes of obtaining such a remedy is set forth
in 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1970).
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government to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
article seized is misbranded or adulterated."2 In contrast, under the
"new drug" provisions, the burden is on the manufacturer to sub-
mit evidence to the FDA proving that his "new drug" is safe and
effective for its intended use before he can legally market the drug
in interstate commerce."3 Thus, where the government's only rem-
edy is seizure and there is no premarket approval requirement-as
is the current law with respect to "devices"-any device can be
distributed in interstate commerce with virtual impunity, and the
burden is on the government when it tries to get the device off the
market.
The list of quack devices is seemingly endless,84 and new ones
continue to be marketed because of the relative ease and impunity
with which this can be done under present federal law. A significant
victory was won by the FDA in 1962 in that the protective shield
which a medical license had given a quack was pierced when the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the "Ellis
Micro-Dynameter" was so misbranded and so worthless as to be
unsafe for use even in the hands of a licensed practitioner. 5
However, although the FDA is certainly continually aware of
the problems presented by quack devices 8 and is constantly at-
tempting to halt their spread by obtaining injunctions against their
interstate distribution, it is severely handicapped by the fact that
this remedy can only be commenced by seizure after interstate
shipment.87 The undesirability of this ex post facto proceeding is
82. See, e.g., United States v. Wood, 226 F.2d 924 (4th Cir. 1955).
83. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1970). If a new drug application has been approved and the
government then widhdraws the approval, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (1970), the bur-
den of proof is then shifted to the government, should the manufacturer challenge the
withdrawal of approval. Bell v. Goddard, 366 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1966).
84. For a sample, and a survey of the FDA's efforts to regulate quack medical devices
by seizure and injunction, see Milstead, Quackery in the Medical Device Field,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND NATIONAL CONGRESS ON MEDICAL QUACKERY (1963). For
an example of the quack devices that continue to be marketed, see United States v. Diapulse
Mfg. Corp., 389 F.2d 612 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 907 (1968), wherein the court
condemned for misbranding a device which was represented as adequate and effective for
121 diseases and related conditions.
85. United States v. Ellis Research Laboratories, Inc.,300 F.2d 550 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 370 U.S. 918 (1962). This "Micro-Dynameter," which was reputed to be able to
diagnose some 55 diseases or conditions, was in fact merely a highly sensitive galvanometer,
and the only thing it measured was the relative amount of perspiration on the skin.
86. See Goddard, Drug and Device Quackery, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD NATIONAL
CONGRESS ON MEDICAL QUACKERY (1966). This is a report by the Commissioner of the
FDA as to the then-current efforts of the FDA to cope with the problems of medical device
quackery and drug abuse.
87. 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1970).
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manifest in that it allows unimpeded initial distribution of the
objectionable device, is difficult to commence, puts the burden of
proof on the government, and is tremendously costly to the govern-
ment and ultimately to the taxpayers, who are in effect "paying"
for these devices twice and still not getting anything for their
money. Moreover this remedy is impractical and inefficient even
if the government overcomes all the obstacles in its path. It is very
costly and virtually impossible to locate all the devices which have
been distributed and are in use, and the manufacturer can start all
over again by changing the name and making an insignificant
modification in his device.
Therefore, whether directly harmful, s8 or directly harmless89
and harmful only indirectly as a result of causing delay in obtaining
legitimate medical treatment, quack medical devices are still very
much a detriment to public health and account for millions of
wasted dollars. The fight goes on to eliminate them, but the odds
are still heavily weighted in favor of the quack.
B. Legitimate Medical Devices
Although the problems presented by quack devices have been
receiving substantial attention,9 the problems pertaining to legiti-
mate medical devices are perhaps greater, more pervasive, and
more serious. That an ill person is defrauded and has his health
endangered by a quack device is, of course, a deplorable matter;
however, that a person who seeks the recognized, legitimate medi-
cal treatment for his injury or condition is subjected to unnecessary
and preventable hazards is even more appalling and egregious.
Although the problems extant in the context of this latter situation
are beginning to receive some limited general publicity,9' for the
most part the public remains unaware of the needless risks it is
88. See, e.g., United States v. 22 Devices, More or Less, Halox Therapeutic Generator,
98 F. Supp. 914 (S.D. Cal. 1951), wherein the device electrolyzed sodium chloride so as to
produce chlorine gas for "chlorine inhalation therapy" with regard to safe levels of
concentration.
89. See. e.g., United States v. Chadiali, 165 F.2d 957 (3d Cir. 1948), wherein the
"Spectro-Chrome" device under attack merely focused harmless colored light on the
patient.
90. This attention is witnessed in part by the sponsorship of the National Congresses
on Medical Quackery by the AMA and FDA in 1961, 1963, and 1966. See notes 84 & 86
supra.
91. See, e.g., Medical Devices: An Unhealthy Situation, 35 CONSUMER REPORTS 256
(1970). This short article provides an excellent and very readable concise summary of the
situation in the absence of effective regulation.
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subjected to in the course of diagnosis and treatment by means of
legitimate medical devices.
While quack devices have received considerable attention from
the FDA-ineffective as the present regulatory mechanisms may
be-the problems presented by legitimate medical devices have
been virtually ignored, simply because the present law affords no
real basis for their regulation. If it is difficult to successfully pro-
ceed against a device that is easily demonstrated to be utterly
worthless and pure quackery, it is virtually impossible (as well as
quite inappropriate) to try to regulate, by means of the present
inadequate procedures, legitimate medical devices which are recog-
nized as having significant medical value, but are not as safe,
reliable, or effective as they could be in light of present knowledge.
As examples, a few types of legitimate medical devices and the
problems they present are discussed below.
1. Orthopedic Internal Fixation Devices and Internal Prostheses
Orthopedic internal fixation devices and internal prostheses
comprise one of the categories of legitimate medical devices with
which there are significant problems. Internal fixation devices con-
sist of the various screws, staples, plates, bands, wires, pins, and
intramedullary nails92 employed in the reduction of bone fractures
and for joint fusion. 3 Internal prostheses are used in the construc-
tion of new movable joints and are used primarily in the recon-
struction of hip joints destroyed by arthritis, bone diseases, or
severe fractures.
There are three basic problems that must be met in implanting
metals in living tissue. 4 The first of these is electrolytic inflamma-
tion, in which the corroding metal causes a tissue reaction. Then
there is the problem of stress tolerance. The metal must be able to
meet the stresses which will be imposed upon it without succumb-
ing to metal fatigue and breaking. Because these stresses can be
quite great, other presently available materials besides metals (and
92. See G. KUNTSCHER, PRACTISE OF INTRAMEDULLARY NAILING (1967). Intramedul-
lary nails are used in the internal fixation of fractures of the long bones. The medullary
canal in the center of the bone is reamed to size and the intramedullary nail is then driven
in to hold the fractured pieces of the cortex in rigid juxtaposition.
93. See generally J. ADAMS, OUTLINE OF FRACTURES (INCLUDING JOINT INJURIES) (5th
ed. 1968), J. ADAMS, OUTLINE OF ORTHOPAEDICS (6th ed. 1967), and A. SHANDS & R.
RANEY, HANDBOOK OF ORTHOPAEDIC SURGERY (7th ed. 1967).
94. C. BECHTOL, A. FERGUSON & P. LAING, METALS AND ENGINEERING IN BONE AND
JOINT SURGERY 19-20 (1959).
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bone) are just not strong enough to be used in internal fixation.
Also, the stress factor must be considered in conjunction with
corrosion, since the combined effects of repeated stress and corro-
sion may cause a metal to fall well below its calculated safe limit.
The third problem is that of insuring that the device is uncontami-
nated when implanted. This means not only uncontaminated by
infection-causing organisms, but also uncontaminated by other
metals or surface defects, and with no new stresses or structural
changes since its manufacture.
Although new alloys are constantly being developed, most
surgical implants manufactured in the United States are made of
one or the other of two kinds of stainless steel or of a cobalt-based
alloy called Vitallium. Of all the available metals, these best meet
the exacting comprehensive requirements for a surgical implant.
However, a manufacturer could decide to use some wholly untried
metal. There is presently no federal law which would require him
to test the resulting devices for safety, reliability, or effectiveness
before he markets them in interstate commerce. Thus, there could
well be another "Elixir Sulfanilamide" disaster, only this time
because of an unsafe surgical implant.
Moreover, there are significant problems with respect to the
devices now on the market made out of the commonly used metals.
While such devices can probably be said to have been proven fairly
safe, reliable, and effective when used under optimum conditions,
problems may arise because the implantation of internal fixation
devices and prostheses is too often done in ignorance or in disre-
gard of the knowledge that has been accumulated about the causes
of adverse metal reactions in surgical implant cases.
Even though the devices manufactured by a particular manu-
facturer may be inherently safe, reliable, and effective when im-
planted only with other devices manufactured by that same manu-
facturer, these same devices may be neither safe, reliable, nor effec-
tive if combined with components made by another manufacturer
who uses a different metal or different manufacturing processes.95
It may seem that this type of mishap is the fault of the surgeon or
the hospital that implanted or allowed to be implanted devices
95. This is due to the fact that the juxtaposition of dissimilar metals or of components
of the same metal in dissimilar conditions in a suitable electrolyte will result in electrolysis,
which in turn results in corrosion. The wet chloride environment of the tissues in the human
body constitutes a very good electrolyte. It was established in 1936 that "except for infec-
tions, all unfavorable reactions about metals in bone were due to electrolysis." C. VENABLE
& W. STUCK, THE INTERNAL FIXATION OF FRACTURES 36 (1947).
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made by different manufacturers, rather than the fault of the indi-
vidual manufacturers, who have no control over what the hospitals
and surgeons do with their devices after they are purchased. It is
certainly true that some hospitals and surgeons could do much with
respect to improving their respective procedures so as to reduce the
risks of corrosion and metal failure with internal fixation devices
and prostheses.96 However, since it is much easier to regulate the
practices of a relatively few manufacturers than it is to reform the
procedures of all the hospitals and surgeons in the United States,
it only makes sense to deal at the manufacturing level with as many
problems as can possibly be prevented there. Thus, simply stated,
although problems such as those resulting from the implantation
of mixed metals and metals in different metallurgical states may
not be the fault of the individual manufacturers, the manufacturers
are in the best position, from a pragmatic standpoint, to do the
most to prevent them.
Certainly, many manufacturers realize that they have a great
responsibility to the public and, in recognition of this, have set up
voluntary standards. However, because of the fact that most inter-
nal fixation devices and prostheses consist of more than one part
(i.e. a plate must be secured by several screws), and components
made by different manufacturers of different metals and by differ-
ent methods are frequently used together in the same fixation,
corrosion and metal failure due to electrolysis is still a frequent
occurrence.
Thus, by virtue of the unique nature of the problem-no matter
how excellent the standards of a particular manufacturer-if his
device is used with another device made by another manufacturer,
who may have equally good standards but use a different metal or
different manufacturing processes, so that there is an electrolytic
potential difference between the devices when implanted within the
body, the patient will be exposed to needless harm, from which
each manufacturer's individual standards afford little or no protec-
tion. This does not mean that manufacturing standards cannot
solve this problem. Rather, it means that such standards must be
extremely uniform on an industry-wide basis, since the slightest
difference in metallurgical condition, not merely the extreme case
of the combination of mixed metals, can give rise to electrolysis
and corrosion. The alternative solutions of either trying to educate
all hospitals and surgeons as to the complexities of the process of
96. See C. BECHTOL, supra note 94, at ch. 2.
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corrosion or of requiring hospitals to buy all of their internal fixa-
tion devices from one manufacturer seem clearly unsatisfactory, if
not impossible. As long as devices made by different manufactur-
ers are incompatible and hospitals continue to purchase different
devices from different manufacturers, the combination of such de-
vices is virtually inevitable.
It might be argued that the threat of civil actions for malprac-
tice against hospitals and surgeons is sufficient to prevent the im-
plantation of incompatible internal fixation devices. However, this
is an unsatisfactory solution for several reasons. First, the patient
may never discover the cause of his difficulty, since the hospital
and surgeon are unlikely to tell him and expose themselves to
liability, and he has almost no other means of discovering the
truth. It is probable that many of the internal fixations that fail
because of adverse metal reactions are never reported. Secondly,
this remedy is undesirable because it merely attempts to compen-
sate for harm for which there really is no compensation, and which
could probably have been prevented by adherence to now known
principles of metal behavior. If the patient had his choice he would
probably much prefer prevention to ex post facto compensation.
Also, litigation is costly and time consuming to both the parties
and the courts, and unnecessary litigation should be avoided when-
ever possible. Finally, a case-by-case remedial approach is a poor
solution when th- problem involved can be prevented at the point
of its inception.
Obviously, there are difficult problems involved in arriving at
any satisfactory solution to a situation which has so many varia-
bles. However, with respect to the metals which have been proven
by experience to be acceptably suitable for the manufacture of
internal fixation devices and prostheses, one way to reduce the
incidence of adverse metal reactions due to electrolysis would be
to require that all devices and components of devices designed for
a particular type of fixation or prosthesis be made of the same
metal and by the same manufacturing processes, by whomever
made. Then it would be impossible to mix metals in different me-
tallurgical conditions in effecting a fixation or other implantation.
Standards of composition as to variation between different melts
of that metal should also then be prescribed.
Although this may seem to be a significant impingement on
free enterprise, it must be remembered that the implantation of
devices in the body is about as intimate an invasion of the person
as can be made. And when it is also considered that the person
[Vol. 55
MEDICAL QUACKERY
affected is so little able to protect himself in this situation, such a
measure might well be warranted and justified. Under the circum-
stances which such regulation would bring about, a surgeon, under
the trying conditions of the operating room, would be unable to
inadvertently secure a bone plate of one metal with bone screws
of another, since all such devices to be used together would be
made of the same metal in the same metallurgical condition, no
matter by whom made. As things are now, when hospitals com-
monly purchase different devices from different manufacturers
who use different metals and different manufacturing methods,
and the hospitals do not carefully separate the different devices in
the operating room, such metal mixing is quite likely to occur. It
is emphasized that it is neither necessary nor desirable that all
internal fixation devices and prostheses be made of the same metal,
since different metals may be best for different types of jobs. It
would only be necessary that all devices and components designed
for the same type of procedure be standardized, so as to minimize
the risks of corrosion and failure as much as possible.
Standardization of sizes and tolerances within sizes would also
seem desirable. In many cases these standards would be quite simi-
lar to the standards voluntarily established by device manufactur-
ers; however, the federal standards would insure complete uniform-
ity and would be enforceable. There is sometimes significant devia-
tion not only between the same size devices manufactured by dif-
ferent manufacturers, but also between the same size devices man-
ufactured by the same manufacturer.9" Also, there is sometimes a
significant discrepancy between the actual dimensions of an inter-
nal fixation device and its labelled dimensions.9"
Although these are only some of the problems that exist with
respect to metal implants, they are problems which could be signif-
icantly reduced by uniform regulation of medical device manufac-
ture and the establishment of a premarket clearance requirement.
Unfortunately, despite recognition of the problems in this and
other medical device areas by several legislators in recent years,99
97. Id. at 95-96.
98. See, e.g., Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. Eutsler, 276 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1960), wherein
an intramedullary nail which varied by more than ten percent from its labelled diameter
became impacted in plaintiffs femur, with resultant incurable osteomyelitis and loss of the
use of his leg. In this case, it was held that an intramedullary nail was a "device" within
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, that it was "misbranded" in violation of the
Act, and that this violation constituted negligence per se (under Virginia law).
99. See, e.g., 115 CONG. REc. L1814-15 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Nelson upon introduc-
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no legislation has been passed, or even gotten out of committee.
Aside from the common problems they share with internal
fixation devices, internal prostheses present some unique problems
in that they are intended to remain in the body for the life of the
patient.' 0 Thus they must be both extremely resistant to corrosion
and strong enough to withstand repeated severe stresses in a corro-
sive environment over a long period of time.'0 ' In addition, there
are special problems of lubrication and wear.' These problems,
unique to internal prosthetic devices, have also been recognized by
legislators, but, as of yet, to no avail. 0 3
2. Electrical and Electronic Medical Devices
Another problem which has received some limited publicity is
the high incidence of accidental electrocutions among hospital pa-
tients in the course of "routine diagnostc tests" or "routine treat-
ment." The number of such accidental electrocutions has been
estimated at 1,200 per year.0 4 Among the causes enumerated for
these electrocutions are high leakage current and poor circuit de-
sign. 10 5 Because more and more electronic equipment is being used,
this problem is an increasing one. The director of scientific and
tion of S. 2107-"The Medical Device Safety Act of 1969"); 115 CONG. REc. 4264 (1969)
(letter from Morton M. Schneider, Office of Legislative & Governmental Services, HEW,
FDA, to Rep. Foley, included as an exhibit upon introduction of H.R. 7315-"The Medical
Device Safety Act of 1969").
100. In contrast, devices employed for internal fixation of fractures are usually removed
after union is effected, since the continued presence of the metal is then unnecessary, may
retard complete healing, and presents the dangers of acute inflammation, osteomyelitis, and
so forth. The only usual exception is with elderly persons where, in view of their age, it is
considered that the operation for removal of the metal presents greater dangers than its
continued presence in the body. See M. MULLER, M. ALLGOWER & H. WILLENEGGER,
TECHNIQUE OF INTERNAL FIXATION OF FRACTURES (1965), and C. BECHTOL, supra note
94, at 44-45.
101. ENGINEERING IN THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE 152 (B. SEGAL & P. KILPATRICK ed.
1967).
102. See INSTITUTE OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERS, LUBRICATION AND WEAR IN LIVING
AND ARTIFICIAL HUMAN JOINTS (1967).
103. 11I CONG. REC. 19067 (1965) (remarks of Sen. Williams upon introduction of S.
2350, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. (1965), a bill to protect the public health by amending the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to assure the safety, efficacy, and reliability of
therapeutic, diagnostic and prosthetic devices).
104. Accidental Electrocutions Claim 1,200 Patients a Year, ELECTRONIC NEws, Jan.
27, 1969, at -, reprinted in 115 CONG. REC. 4265 (1969). The FDA's own estimates are
more conservative; 656 deaths and in escess of 10,000 injuries were attributed by it to all
types of medical device malfunctions between 1963 and 1969. The Law Moves In On
Medical Hardware, BUSINESS WEEK, March 18, 1972, at 51.
105. Accidental Electrocutions Claim 1,200 Patients a Year, supra noe 104.
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medical instrumentation at Downstate Medical Center, State Uni-
versity of New York, estimated that 40 percent of incoming equip-
ment is defective with respect to safety requirements." 6 At least
one manufacturer of electronic monitoring equipment, which is
connected directly to the patient, voluntarily undertook to have all
such equipment approved by Underwriter's Laboratory.'" How-
ever, there is no requirement that such approval be sought, and
many manufacturers do not submit their products for testing. The
establishment of a uniform requirement for such approval would
be one way of reducing the number of accidental electrocutions
caused by electrically unsafe medical equipment.
The chief defects in these electrical and electronic devices which
can cause accidental electrocution are faulty wiring, so as to result
in direct application of the line current to the patient,0 8 and leak-
age current caused by inadequate grounding."' The first results in
gross shock, which usually kills by causing fibrillation of the heart,
but may also kill by attacking the brain's respiratory control center
or paralyzing the muscles used in breathing. Leakage current is a
problem with such diagnostic devices as cardiac cathethers, which
can introduce current directly into the body, by-passing the greater
resistance of the skin. When current is introduced directly into the
heart, as little as 20 microamperes can induce fatal ventricular
fibrillation." 0 Also, it is quite possible that the figure of 1,200
electrocutions per year is conservative. Hospitals are obviously not
going out of their way to publicize such deaths, and death caused
by fibrillation accidentally induced by leakage current leaves no
evidence that shows up at autopsy and is indistinguishable from
death due to natural causes."'
Although some of the problems in this area may be due to
deficiencies in the electrical system of the hospital or in the connec-
tion of one machine to another, a large percentage of these acci-
dental electrocutions could probably be avoided by better equip-
ment design and mandatory premarket testing. The fact that these
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Letter from Morton M. Schneider, supra note 99.
109. Doyle, Designers of Medical Instruments Face Serious Qestions on Safety,
ELECTRONICS, Feb. 17, 1969, at _. This article was reprinted in 115 CONG. REC. 4264-
65 (1969).
110. Id.
I11. Id.
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instruments are usually quite complex and are often used by techni-
cians having little or no knowledge of or training in electronics or
electricity is all the more reason to require manufacturers to make
these machines as inherently safe and foolproof as possible.
Experts have said that electrical hazards are exceeded only by
misadministration of drugs and falling out of bed as the leading
cause of hospital accidents, and that the risk keeps rising with the
ever-increasing use of electronic equipment for diagnosis, monitor-
ing, and treatment.12 Having noted that "hospitals tend to be apa-
thetic about the problem and equipment manufacturers indiffer-
ent,"" 3 these same experts" 4 indicated a need for "stiff quality
standards and the machinery for enforcement.""' It has been sug-
gested that each hospital should attempt writing the necessary
standards into its purchase orders;"6 however, this seems like a
very unsatisfactory and unworkable solution. Uniform federal
standards would seem to be beneficial to all parties concerned,
since the public would benefit by the increased safety of such de-
vices, the hospitals would have certifications that the equipment
they are using is safe, and the manufacturers would have a defense,
in the event of litigation, afforded by the fact that their product
complied with the applicable standards."7
3. Other Medical Devices
Orthopedic internal fixation devices and prostheses, and elec-
trical and electronic diagnostic, monitoring, and therapeutic in-
struments are certainly not the only classes of medical devices
which present problems in the absence of standards and a pre-
market clearance requirement.
Another class of devices which present actual and potential
problems with respect to safety are intauterine contraceptive de-
vices (IUDs). These devices are being marketed in many different
forms by many different manufacturers and are being used by
112. Randal, Electrical Risk in Hospitals Is Held Rising, Washington (D.C.) Evening
Star, Feb. 17, 1969, § -, at -, col. __. This article was reprinted in 115 CONG.
REc. 4267 (1969).
113. the experts who have made these statements include Dr. Carl Walters, Surgeon
at Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, Boston, Mass.; David Lubin, Administrative Engineer of
Sinai Hospital, Baltimore, Md.; and Paul E. Stanely of Purdue University School of
Engineering.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Engineering in the Practice of Medicine, supra note 101, at 72.
117. Id. 73.
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women in ever-increasing numbers. Although IUDs were found to
be highly effective (although not quite as reliable as oral contracep-
tives) and generally safe, a 1968 FDA report stated:
The safety of the material used, the quality control in its manu-
facture, and the labeling and packaging of intrauterine devices
are at present the sole concern of each manufacturer. Further-
more, new devices can be introduced practically at will.'
The most common short-term adverse reactions reported with re-
spect to IUDs were infection and uterine perforation during inser-
tion. Although serious adverse reactions were relatively rare, this
may have been due, in part, to underreporting. It was suggested
that suitable standards of sterility in packaging could reduce the
incidence of infection, and that the number of cases of uterine
perforation followed by intestinal obstruction might be reduced by
avoiding the use of closed type devices which open upon inser-
tion."9 For these reasons and because these devices are intended
to remain in the body for long periods of time, and in light of the
fact that it is too early to tell whether such devices or certain kinds
of such devices may have long-term harmful effects, it was recom-
mended that IUD's be included within the proposed medical device
legislation requiring premarket clearance, although legislation di-
rected specifically at contraceptive devices was opposed.'
A rapidly expanding frontier in medicine is the development of
artificial internal organs and extracorporeal machines. 1' These
also are not now subject to federal standards or premarket clear-
ance requirements. The problems presented by these kinds of medi-
cal devices are legion, and no attempt will be made todiscuss them
here other than to say that reasonable federal standards for and
premarket regulation of such devices, with adequate exemptions
for investigational and experimental uses, is probably in the best
interest of the public for much the same reasons as with other
medical devices. Namely, the harm to the public in the form of
needless dangers prevented by such regulation will be greater than
the harm to the public (in the sense of discouragement of research
and development of new beneficial devices) caused by such
regulation.
118. FDA ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, REPORT ON IN-
TRAUTERINE CONTRACEPTIVE DEVICES 39 (1968).
119. Id. 8
120. Id. 40. See note 202 infra.
121. See D. LONGMORE, SPARE-PART SURGERY (1968).
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New types of devices are constantly being developed and exist-
ing devices are continually being modified.' This innovation and
evolution should certainly not be discouraged. But, at the same
time, it is paradoxical and unnecessary that the public should be
subjected to needless dangers by the very devices designed to pro-
mote, preserve, and protect public health. Undoubtedly, a compro-
mise approach which balances the public's current need for greater
protection with the realities of business would be most desirable.
Some medical device manufacturers maintain that stringent gov-
ernment regulation will stifle the development of new products and
may even put small manufacturers out of business. However, oth-
ers would welcome reasonable regulaion because it would clear up
the present confusion resulting from the "drug-device" dichotomy
and because federal standards would upgrade the industry and
prevent the unfair competition to which safety-conscious manufac-
turers are now subjected by other manufacturers who are less
concerned.1'2
There seems to be little real doubt that reasonable standards
for and premarket regulation of some types of medical devices is
necessary and desirable. It also appears likely that some legislation
ofithis kind (which has been introduced in Congress continually
since 1954) will actually be passed. Congress must now determine
precisely what type of requirements and standards to impose and
what scope and application they should have. The medical device
industry could seemingly best protect both its own interests and the
best interests of the public by cooperating in the development of
reasonable regulatory measures. Continued resistance against any
further regulation may only result in the hurried passage of unduly
restrictive and ill-considered legislation should there occur another
well-publicized tragedy, this time involving a medical device.
IV. THE RECENT JUDICIAL DECISIONS12 4
In view of the fact that the dichotomy between the regulation
122. Soft contact lenses present a good example of this. Hard lenses were established
as "devices," and therefore it was assumed that a soft variant thereof would likewise be a
"device." However, because soft lenses can be used to treat eye diseases as well as correct
vision, and because they may harbor infections, the FDA classified them as "drugs" in 1968,
thus making them subject to the "new-drug" premarket clearance requirements. When a
Medical Device May Be a Drug, BUSINESS WEEK, March 18, 1972, at 52.
123. See, e.g., The Law Moves In On Medical Hardware, supra note 104.
124. For other discussions of the recent cases dealing with the definitional problems
presented by the 1938 Act, as amended, see Styn, supra note 34, at 518-32, and Weitzman,
supra note 34, at 321-40.
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of "drugs" and "devices" with respect to premarket clearance has
existed since 1938, it is somewhat remarkable that the courts have
not had to construe the definitions of "drug" and "device" in light
of this dichotomy until quite recently. As already pointed out, since
the definitions of "drug" and "device" are in part identical,'25 but
only "new drugs" are subject to premarket approval, 21 the manu-
facturer of a new product which could arguably fall under either
definition has a powerful incentive to maintain that his product is
a "device." What is also surprising is that cases did not arise earlier
presenting the situation of a manufacturer claiming his new prod-
uct is a "device" and therefore not subject to the premarket clear-
ance requirement, while the FDA contends it is a "drug" not gen-
erally recognized by qualified experts as safe and effective for its
intended use, so as to be a "new drug" subject to premarket ap-
proval. Finally, however, such cases have been presented and de-
cided.
A. AMP Inc. v. Gardner'2
In this case, the plaintiff manufacturer sought a declaratory
judgment declaring its products to be "devices" and an injunction
against application and enforcement of the "new drug" provisions
with respect to the products concerned. Both plaintiff and defen-
dants-nominally the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
and the Commission of Food and Drugs-moved for summary
judgment, the defendants contending that the items in question
were "drugs," not "devices." The products involved were intended
for use by surgeons in ligating blood vessels severed during surgery.
They consisted of a disposable applicator in the form of either a
hemostat or a long slender tube, the nylon ligature itself, and a
nylon locking disc which maintained the ligature loop in a tight-
ened position after it was pulled tight around a blood vessel. The
excess ligature was then cut off, the applicator removed, and the
ligature loop and locking disc remained in the body. (Ordinarily,
severed blood vessels are hand-tied by the surgeon with a reef
knot.)
Plaintiff had initially written to the FDA asking whether these
products would be classified as "drugs," "new drugs," or "de-
125. See notes 64 & 65 and accompanying text supra.
126. See notes 29 & 30 supra and notes 62 & 63 and accompanying ext supra.
127. 275 F. Supp. 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), affd, 389 F.2d 825 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 825 (1968), rehearing denied, sub nom. AMP Inc. v. Cohen, 395 U.S. 917 (1969).
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vices," and was advised that they would be considered "new
drugs." Six months after filing for an investigational exemption,'28
AMP was advised by the FDA of various deficiencies with respect
to the investigational exemption and was told that long-term stud-
ies would be required concerning the possible carcinogenic effects
of the nylon ligature and locking disc remaining in the body. Sub-
sequently, plaintiff took the position that its products were "de-
vices," and after threat of regulatory action by the FDA for failure
to comply with the investigational drug regulations, removed its
products from interstate commerce and commenced an action for
a declaratory judgment.
AMP contended that its products were principally mechanical
instruments, with the nylon ligaure and locking disc being merely
"components, parts, or accessories" thereof, so that the products
as a whole were "devices" under section 201(h). 29 The FDA main-
tained that the hemostat and long selnder tube merely constituted
unique applicators for administering a nylon suture, that a suture
is a "drug," and that the products constitued "new drugs," since
this new method of application was not generally recognized by
qualified experts as safe and effective for use under the conditions
recommended. 31
The district court granted summary judgment for the FDA 13
concluding that the essential element of AMP's products was the
suture. Analogizing the products to drugs administered by means
of disposable syringes, such syringes alone being "devices," the
court said that the mere packaging of a drug in a syringe did not
make it a component of a device. Thus, if the suture were a "drug,"
the use of such a "device" as an applicator did not convert the
suture into a mere component of the "device."' ' 2
128. 21 U.S.C. § 355(i) (1970).
129. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (1970). See note 59 supra.
130. See note 29 supra.
131. 275 F. Supp. at 416.
132. However, the court did not agree with defendants' contention that he fact that
sutures were listed in the official United States Pharmacopeia was conclusive to classify the
products as "drugs." This, said the court, would make meaningless the express exclusion
of "devices" from the "drug" definition, and, therefore, the listing of an item in an official
compendium is merely "some evidence" that such item is a "drug."
Both parties had argued that he terms "drug" and "device" were mutually exclusive.
Without further comment, the court quoted Toulmin to the effect that these terms should
not be defined as mutually exclusive. As indicated in note 67 supra, Toulmin has now
reversed his position on this point. The definition of "drug" expressly excludes "devices,"
so a "device" cannot also be a "drug;" for the same reason, a "drug" cannot also be a
"device," because if it is a "device," it is not a "drug."
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After discussing the ambiguity of the "drug" and "device"
definitions, 33 and assuming that AMP's products could arguably
fit within either, the court concluded that the remedial nature of
the Act warranted a liberal construction for the protection of the
public health, and thus held them to be "drugs."
The public will be better protected by classifying'plaintiff's prod-
ucts as drugs rather than as devices so that proper testing, con-
trolled by the Government, can be pursued. It would seem that
where an item is capable of coming within two definitions, that
definition according the public the greatest protection should be
accepted.'
The court also agreed with defendants that plaintiff's products
were "new drugs," since the unique method of administration of a
suture gave rise to a genuine difference of medical opinion as to
their safety and efficacy for use in ligating blood vessels severed
during surgery.1 3
AMP then appealed, and the judgment below was affirmed.'
The court of appeals agreed with AMP that the applicators taken
along were "instruments," and therefore "devices." However, it
also agreed with the district court's syringe analogy, concluding
that the ligature and locking disc were the essential elements of the
new products. Thus, the applicators were considered to be "compo-
nents" of the ligature and disc, not vice versa. 37
More disturbed about the express exclusion of "devices" from
the "drug" definition than the district court had been, the court of
appeals undertook a review of the legislative history' 3 to ascertain
the purpose of the separate definition of "device," so as to deter-
mine the kind of things Congress meant to distinguish from the
"articles" that are "drugs." Absent this exclusion there would have
been no hesitancy to classify AMP's new products as "drugs." The
court concluded that there was nothing in the legislative history to
indicate that the separate definition of device was for any purpose
other than to avoid the semantic incongruity of classifying mechan-
ical applicances, such as electric belts, as "drugs." It was also
concluded that the "new drug" provisions were incorporated into
133. See notes 64 & 65 and accompanying text supra.
134. 275 F. Supp. at 414.
135. Id. at 415.
136. AMP Inc. v. Gardner, 389 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1968).
137. Id. at 827.
138. See notes 23-75 and accompanying text supra.
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the Act without awareness of the fact that the "drug"-"device"
distinction had for the first time become significant. 3
The opinion then reasons that since the only difference between
classifying the new products as "drugs" instead of "devices" is that
they might be subject to the "new drug" provisions if "drugs," they
must be classified in light of the purpose of the "new drug" provi-
sions. The court found this purpose "very clearly" to be, "to keep
inadequately tested medical and related products which might
cause widespread danger to human life out of interstate com-
merce."'' 0 It was then held that AMP's new products had been
correctly declared to be "drugs," because ligatures14' might present
the same dangers as products commonly called "drugs," and thus
were intended to be covered,' and also because a statute touching
the public health is usually not narrowly construed. The court also
cited the fact that nylon suture material of the type from which
plaintiff's ligatures were made was included in the United States
Pharmacopeia,"' and concluded: "The exclusionary classification
'devices' should, we think, be limited to such things as Congress
expressly intended it to cover."'44
The court of appeals also agreed with the district court that
AMP's products were "new drugs." The Supreme Court refused
to grant certiorari. 45
139. 389 F.2d at 829.
140. Id.
141. The court rejected the distinction AMP attempted to make between a suture, which
sews tissue, and a ligature, which ties it. Id. at 830 n.12.
142. As the court noted:
The product which immediately precipated Congressional concern-"Elixir Sulfani-
lamide"-was a drug within the everyday, narrow sense of the word, but we would
hardly suppose that when Congress incorporated the "new drug" bills resulting from
the "Elixir Sulfanilamide" tragedy into an Act which contained an extremely broad
definition of the word "drug" it intended that the operation of those provisions
should be restricted to products commonly called "drugs," and that products such
as ligatures, which might present the very dangers the provisions were designed to
meet, should be excluded.
Id. at 829-30.
143. The accuracy of the court's additional statement that nylon suture material has
always been regarded as "drugs" by the FDA depends on when "always" begins. Appar-
ently there was doubt as to whether sutures were within the "drug" definition of the 1906
Act, and this is one of the reasons why the word "device" was added to the "drug" definition
in the earlier versions of the 1938 Act. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
144. 389 F.2d at 830.
145. 393 U.S. 825 (1968), rehearing denied, 395 U.S. 917 (1969).
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B. United States v. An Article of Drug * ** Bacto Unidisk'"
In 1945, Congress added section 507117 to the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which required premarket certification
of "antibiotic drugs" pursuant to regulations promulgated by the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, establishing such
standards as were necessary to adequately ensure that each batch
of these substances is safe and effective. Section 502(1)148 then
provides that such antibiotics are "misbranded" unless batch-
certified or exempted. As with the "new drug" provisions, since the
term "antibiotic drug" is defined as "any drug,"" 9 a product must
first be classified as a "drug" within the meaning of the Act 5 '
before it can be determined to be an "antibiotic drug" and there-
fore subject to the premarket batch-certification requirement.
In response to the need for a way of determining which of the
many available antibiotics would be most effective in treating a
particular infection in a particular patient, products called anti-
biotic sensitivity discs were developed. In 1960, the FDA under-
took to regulate these discs under section 507, and regulations
requiring preclearance, batch-testing, and certification were pro-
mulgated. Since section 507 only applied to "antibiotic drugs," the
validity of these regulations was dependent on whether or not these
antibiotic sensitivity discs were "drugs" within the meaning of the
Act. If they were not, they were not subject to premarket regula-
tion under section 507 or elsewhere, and these regulations would
therefore be unauthorized and invalid.15 1
In the first case that presented this issue, it was held that the
particular antibiotic sensitivity discs involved were "drugs." Thus,
the regulations were found to be valid, and the manufacturer was
enjoined from introducing his "MULTIDISKS" into interstate
commerce without certification." 2 However, another district court
146. 392 F.2d 21 (6th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 394 U.S. 784, rehearing denied, 395 U.S. 954
(1969).
147. 21 U.S.C. § 357 (1970).
148. 21 U.S.C. § 352(1) (1970).
149. 21 U.S.C. § 357(a) (1970).
150. 21 U.S.C. § 321 (1970), the general definitions section of the Act, begins merely
with, "For the purposes of this Act. ... There is no phrase-such as, "unless the context
otherwise requires"-which might provide some leeway. Also, as has been indicated, the
fact that he individual definitions begin, "The term ...means," rather than includes,
further restricts their flexibility. See notes 69 & 70 and accompanying text supra.
151. This history of the premarket antibiotic batch-certification requirement is drawn
from Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. at 784-89.
152. United States v. Consolidated Laboratories, Inc.,
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thereafter held that a similar type of antibiotic sensitivity disc was
not a "drug." '153
In a very brief opinion, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgment in the latter case.154 The product involved,
"Bacto-Unidisk," consists of a small cardboard ring with eight
circular paper units, seven impregnated with different antibiotics
and the eighth impregnated with sulfadiazine, extending inwardly
from the ring. 155 The purpose of the "Unidisk" is to determine the
antibiotic which would be most effective in treating an infection,
without experimenting directly on the patient. Instead, samples of
virus grown from a specimen (blood, urine, sputum, and the like)
taken from the patient are placed on the various circular units
impregnanted with different antibiotics and the most effective an-
tiobiotic is thereby determined as being the one which most retards
growth of the virus.'56
This case originated when the government filed a libel of con-
demnation against a quantity of the product, alleging that the
"Unidisks" were "misbranded" under section 502(1), since they
contained "antiobiotic drugs" which had neither been certified nor
exempted from certification. In affirming the judgment for the
manufacturer, based on the finding that the product was not a
"drug" under the Act, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals did little
more than reiterate the district court's opinion.
Somehow, the chief issue at the trial in the district court was
thought by both parties and the judge to be whether this product
fitted within the generally recognized medical definition of
drugs-that is, substances which are either applied to or taken into
the body for treatment of injury or disease. Indeed, one of the
judge's conclusions of law was that there was no basis for conclud-
ing that Congress intended the definition of "drug" to extend be-
yond the medical definition of that term.5 7 In the words of Senator
153. United States v. An Article of Drug *** Bacto-Unidisk, Case No. -, (E.D.
Mich., July 21, 1966).
154. 393 F.2d 21 (6th Cir. 1968).
155. Id. at 21.
156. 394 U.S. at 787.
157. The court of appeals quoted this finding:
In medical science the concept of "drugs" is limited to articles administered to
man or other animals, either internally or externally. This is the general accepted
view among physicians. The evidence affords no basis for the conclusion that the
definition of "drug" in the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act-21 U.S.C.
321(g)-was intended by Congress to extend beyond the meaning of that erm in
medical science, to encompass these sensitivity disks.
392 F.2d at 23.
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Clark,' this conclusion is virtually a "palpable absurdity," since
the legislative history indicates nothing if not that the term "drug"
is a term of art and was intended to be construed very broadly.'59
Moreover, since the term "drug" is defined in the statute, the
proper question was whether a "Bacto-Unidisk" fell within the
provisions of the statutory definition. It was irrelevant whether or
not it met the medical definition of a drug.
Even more amazingly, although the district judge admitted that
on a literal reading the language of the section 201(g)(1)(B) defini-
tion of "drug,"' 60 "clearly has application to the article libeled
herein,"'' the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals said that this was
true only in an indirect sense, since the sensitivity disc itself was
not intended for use "either internally or externally to cure, miti-
gate or treat disease."' 6 2 Concluding, again in agreement with the
trial judge, that "it was not the legislative intent to apply the phrase
'intended for use in the . . . cure, mitigation, treatment' . . . in
such an indirect manner,"' 63 the court held that a "Bacto-
Unidisk" was not a "drug" within the meaning of the Act and was
therefore not required to be certified or exempted pursuant to
section 507 before it could be legally marketed in interstate
commerce.
The government then appealed, and the Supreme Court re-
versed the decision below.'64 Chief Justice Warren, writing the
opinion of the Court, stated that the courts below were correct in
determining that the issue was whether the antibiotic sensitivity
disc regulations were authorized by the Act's definition of "drug"
and not whether premarket certification of these discs was really
necessary to protect the public health. 6 5 However, this was about
the only point on which the Supreme Court did not find the lower
courts in error.
First, Chief Justice Warren, reviewing the legislative history, 66
demonstrated that the term "drug" was a term of art and was
clearly intended to encompass "far more than the strict medical
158. See notes 50-51 and accompanying text supra.
159. See notes 40-42 and accompanying text supra.
160. See note 59 supra.
161. 392 F.2d at 22.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. 394 U.S. 784 (1964).
165. Id. at 791.
166. See notes 23-75 and accompanying text supra.
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definition of that word."'0 7 He then pointed out that "devices"
were removed from the "drug" definition and separately defined
for semantic reasons only, the separate definitions having had no
substantive significance until the "new drug" provisions were
added. 6" Thus, the lower courts erred in refusing to apply the
language of the "drug" definition literally-the broad coverage
which the district court characterized as "ridiculous and contrary
to common sense"' 69 being precisely what Congress had in-
tended. 170 Furthermore, it was stated that this congressional intent
must be given effect
in view of the well-accepted principle that remedial legislation
such as the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is to be given a liberal
construction consistent with the Act's overriding purpose to pro-
tect the public health, and specifically, § 507's purpose to ensure
that antibiotic products marketed serve the public with "effi-
cacy" and "safety.' 1 71
In summary, the Court concluded that:
Viewing the structure, the legislative history and the remedial
nature of the remedial nature of the Act, we think it plain that
Congress intended to define "drug" far more broadly than does
the medical profession.' 72
Thus, the lower courts' restriction of the "drug" definition to
items conceived of as drugs in the medical sense of the term, so as
to limit it to articles directly administered either internally or ex-
ternally, was resoundingly rejected by the Supreme Court.
Having disposed of the respondent's primary contention that
none of the provisions of the Act applied to antibiotic sensivitity
discs "because Congress did not intend the Act to cover articles
used so indirectly in the 'cure, mitigation, [and] treatment' of dis-
ease," 7 3 the Court went on to consider and reject the alternative
contention that even if the discs did fall within the Act, they were
"devices" and thus by definition could not be "drugs."
Since the discs could be arguably either "drugs" or "devices,"
the classification, said the Court, should be made in light of statu-
167. 394 U.S. at 793.
168. Id. at 797-98.
169. Id. at 790.
170. Id. at 798.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 793.
173. Id. at 792.
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tory purposes, and since the purpose of section 507 to provide for
safe and effective antibiotics would be subverted if the wrong anti-
biotic were administered because of a deficiency in the sensitivity
disc, it was reasonable for the Secretary to determine that the discs
were also "drugs" and thus also subject to premarket
certification. 174
Moreover, Chief Justice Warren stated:
"[T]he legislative history, read in the light of the statute's reme-
dial purpose, directs us to read the classification 'drug' broadly,
and to confine the device exception as nearly as is possible to the
types of items Congress suggested in the debates, such as electric
belts, quack diagnostic scales, and therapeutic lamps, as well as
bathroom weight scales, shoulder braces, air conditioning units,
and crutches. In upholding the Secretary's determination here,
without deciding the precise contours of the 'device' classifica-
tion, we need only point out that the exception was created pri-
marily for the purpose of avoiding the semantic incongruity of
classifying as drugs (1) certain quack contraptions and (2) basic
aids used in the routine operation of a hospital-items character-
ized more by their purely mechanical nature than by the fact that
they are composed of complex chemical compounds or biological
substances."' 75
Justice Douglas was the sole dissenter from the majority opin-
ion. He would have affirmed the judgment because he felt that "it
would indeed be difficult to write a clearer description of an anti-
biotic sensitivity disc ' 176 than that provided by the language of the
"device" definition in section 201(h).
The ambiguity and difficulty in application of the present pro-
visions is well demonstrated by the gyrations the courts in these
cases found necessary in order to decide the matters before them.
Even though the "right" result was probably reached, excursions
into legislative history and resort to public policy as the final basis
of decision should not be necessary in applying a statute *which
174. Id. at 798-99. It has been pointed out by one commentator that the antibiotic
sensitivity discs could have held to be "drugs" merely by applying the language of part (D)
of the "drug" definition, and thus it would not have been necessary to resort to any strained
construction in light of statutory purpose. The reasoning would be that the essential parts
of the discs are the impregnated antibiotics, and these are certainly "drugs," so that the
disc would merely be "an article intended for use as a component" of an article specified
in clause (B), and therefore also a "drug." Styn, supra note 34, at 531. See note 59 supra
for the definition of' drug."
175. Id. at 799-800.
176. Id. at 801.
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affects such a broad and vital public interest. Instead of facilitating
predictability and certainty, the present definitions and statutory
framework only cause confusion and encourage attempts at avoid-
ance.
C. The "Drug"-"Cosmetic" Cases
There are also recent cases dealing with the issue of whether a
new product is a "cosmetic" or a "drug" within the Act."' Like
"devices," "cosmetics" are not now subject to any premarket
clearance requirement. Thus, the situation again is one where the
manufacturer contends his product is a "cosmetic" while the FDA
contends it is a "drug" and a "new drug."' 78 In two cases reaching
United States Court of Appeals, the new products, which were
"wrinkle removers," were determined to be "drugs."' 79 However,
a more recent district court decision involving another "wrinkle
remover" held that the product was not a "drug."' 80
Since the definitions of "drug" and "cosmetic," unlike the defi-
nitions of "drug" and "device," are not mutually exclusive, it is
possible for a product to be subject to simultaneous regulation as
a "cosmetic," a "drug," and a "new drug." Therefore, the issue
in these cases is not whether the product is a "drug" instead of a
"cosmetic," but whether it is a "drug" as well as a "cosmetic."
Since 1953, numerous bills have been introduced in Congress
that would have required premarket testing of new cosmetics, 8, but
as with the similar, and in some cases the same, bills dealing with
devices, none has yet been passed.
V. Is ADDITIONAL LEGISLATION REALLY REQUIRED?
It has been suggested that there may be no need for Congress
to enact legislation requiring premarket clearance of medical de-
177. See DiPrima, Which Cosmetics Are Also Drugs?-The Wrinkle Lotion Cases, 27
THE BUSINESS LAWYER 49 (1971).
178. See note 59 supra for the definitions of "drug" and "cosmetic." See note 29 supra
for the definition of "new drug."
179. United States v. Article Consisting of 36 Boxes . . . Line Away, Temporary
Wrinkle Smoother, Coty, 415 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1969), affg 284 F. Supp. 107 (D. Del. 1968);
United States v. An Article. . . Consisting of 216 Cartoned Bottles . . . Sudden Change,
409 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'g 288 F. Supp. 29 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
180. United States v. An Article. . . 47 Shipping Cartons, Magic Secret, 331 F. Supp.
912 (D. Md. 1971).
181. For a list of such bills through the 90th Congress see United Statesv. An Article
. . . Consisting of 216 Cartoned Bottles . . . Sudden Change, 288 F. Supp. 29, 37-38
(E.D.N.Y. 1968).
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vices because the recent "judicial legislation" engaged in by the
courts has made such legislation unnecessary. 182 It is true that the
Supreme Court's broad construction of "drug" in Bacto-Unidisk
should allow the FDA to successfully maintain that products which
could be arguably either "drugs" or "devices" are to be classified
as "drugs."' However, the fact that the FDA can probably pre-
vail in a court contest over the proper classification of a new prod-
uct is still not a satisfactory solution to the problem of the "drug-
device" dichotomy.
Under the present law, the FDA must first make a seizure of
the device it alleges is "adulterated"' 84 or "misbranded"'8 5 in order
to commence a prosecution. The purpose of such seizure, pursuant
to section 304,188 is merely to secure in rem jurisdiction. The seizure
procedure is not designed to remove all devices of the type in
question from the market; in fact, multiple seizures for misbrand-
ing are prohibited except when the alleged misbranding has already
been adjudicated in favor of the United States in a prior proceeding
under the Act, or when the Secretary finds probable cause to be-
lieve the product is "dangerous to public health" or the labeling is
fraudulent or would be materially misleading to the injury or dam-
182. Kleinfeld, Surgical Implants: Drugs or Devices, and New Device Legislation, 23
FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 510, 516-18 (1968). This suggestion was made in view only of AMP
Inc. v. Gardner, since Bacto-Unidisk had not yet been decided by the Supreme Court at
the time this article was written. In a more recent article, which briefly discusses the current
state of confusion as to the regulation of medical devices, Mr. Kleinfeld predicts that
legislation providing for some form of preclearance and standardization will be enacted in
the near future. Kleinfeld, Sterile Disposable and Other Therapeutic Devices and the Law,
27 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 19 (1972). The pro-legislation viewpoint is set forth in two other
recent articles: Cooper, Device Legislation, 26 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 165 (1971) and
Pilot, Remarks on Medical Devices, 25 FOOD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 466 (1970). Dr. Cooper
was chairman of the committee which studied the standards and pre-clearance aspects of
medical device regulation pursuant to President Nixon's October 30, 1969, message to
Congress to the effect that minimum standards should be established for certain medical
devices and authority should be granted to require premarket clearance in some circumstan-
ces. The general recommendations resulting from this study are set forth in Dr. Cooper's
article. Basically, it was recommended that (1) a panel of experts be organized to review
existing devices and advise in the categorization of medical devices; (2) the Secretary of
HEW be given authority to certify acceptable existing standards, establish or encourage the
development of new standards, and audit manufacturers for compliance; and (3) legislation
providing for premarket evaluation be enacted to avoid the dangers of marketing inade-
quately tested medical devices and to promote needed new device development. 26 FoOD
DRUG Cosm. L.J. at 170-71.
183. See Styn, supra note 34, at 533.
184. 21 U.S.C. § 351 (1970). As a practical matter, "devices" will seldom be subject
to this section.
185. 21 U.S.C. § 352 (1970).
186. 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1970).
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age of the consumer."" Obviously this libel for condemnation pro-
cedure is very cumbersome. It is also very ineffective in that dev-
icds which may be dangerous are already in distribution before
proceedings can be commenced against them. 8' In the event of an
extremely dangerous device, this could be too late.
Even of multiple seizures were permitted without limitation,
this is a very impractical and expensive procedure, since it is very
difficult to trace the devices to their ultimate location and virtually
impossible to recover them all. Moreover, by making insignificant
changes in the product and changing the name, the manufacturer
can evade the initial seizure and force the FDA to institute a
separate proceedings against each variation of the device. Finally,
there is the fundamental inconsistency that the burden of proof is
on the Government to prove that a new "device" is misbranded in
order to get it off the market, while with "new drugs" the burden
is on the manufacturer to prove that the product is safe and effec-
tive before it can legally be put on the market."8 '
Present law also provides for injunction' and criminal penal-
ties. ' However, these sanctions are insufficient for purposes of
affording protection from inadequately tested unsafe or ineffective
medical devices for the same reasons that the libel for condemna-
tion procedure is inadequate. At best, all three of these sanctions
may prevent continuing harm if the Government is completely
successful in court. However, even in this event, the damage result-
ing from the initial distribution will have already been done.
It appears that the public would be better protected if the law
were such that unsafe, unreliable, and ineffective devices could
never get on the market, as opposed to the present law, which
seems to heavily favor the manufacturers of quack devices and the
manufactures of legitimate medical devices who do not conduct
adequate premarket testing. The present law seems detrimental
both to the public and to the conscientious manufacturer who does
conduct adequate premarket testing of his devices, because he is
put at a competitive disadvantage with respect to the other manu-
facturers who do not spend the money to do this.
187. 21 U.S.C. § 334(a)(l)(A) & (B) (1970).
188. Adulterated or misbranded devices are only liable to be proceeded against "while
in interstate commerce, or at any time thereafter." 21 U.S.C. § 334(a)(1) (1970).
189. See noes 82 & 83 and accompanying text supra.
190. 21 U.S.C. § 332 (1970).
191. 21 U.S.C. § 333 (1970).
[Vol. 55
MEDICAL QUACKERY
Moreover, it is questionable just how far the Supreme Court's
broad construction of "drug" in Bacto-Unidisk can be stretched.
In both AMP and Bacto the products involved were border-line;
they arguably could have been classified as either "drugs" or "de-
vices." In AMP, although the decision was grounded primarily on
public policy, the Second Circuit did note that sutures (equating
ligatures and sutures)19 are listed in the United States Pharmaco-
peia, 193 which puts them within the "drug" definition of the Act
under part (A) of the definition. 94 And, in Bacto-Unidisk, the
antibiotics with which the units comprising the sensitivity disc were
impregnated were certainly "drugs." '195 Thus, this broad construc-
tion of the definition of "drug" may not be so broud at all, since
the decided cases have dealt only with products of which one com-
ponent was squarely within the "drug" definition. In these cases,
as already indicated, the products as a whole could more easily
have been classified as "drugs" merely by employing the seemingly
forgotten part (D) of the "drug" definition. 9'
There are many medical devices which would not fit within the
judicially broadened definition of "drug." Chief Justice Warren's
guidelines in Bacto-Unidisk as to the "contours" of the "device"
classificatin, even though dicta, are sure to be seized upon by de-
vice manufacturers who seek to avoid premarket clearance. 9 ' In
fact, it would seem that most of ty devices which currently present
problems would fall within the suggested limits of the "device"
classification, as either "quack contraptions" or "basic aids used
in the routine operation of a hospital"-both such classes being
"characterized more by their purely mechanical nature than by the
fact that they are composed of' complex chemical compounds or
biological substances."'99
According to these guidelines, quack devices are expressly
within the "device" classification, and therefore are not subject to
premarket clearance; and, by virtue of the "basic-aids-used-in-the-
routine-operation-of-a-hospital" and "purely-mechanical-nature"
language, orthopedic internal fixation devices and electrical and
electronic diagnostic, monitoring, and therapeutic devices are
192. See note 141 supra.
193. 389 F.2d at 830.
194. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(A) (1970). See note 59 supra.
195. See note 174 supra.
196. See note 174 and accompanying text supra.
197. See note 175 and accompanying text supra, where these guidelines are quoted.
198. Id.
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"devices" not subject to premarket clearance. Of the examples
discussed in this paper, only some intrauterine contraceptive de-
vices (IUDs) and artificial internal organs would seem to stand a
chance of not being classified as "devices," since these may fit
within the class of items "composed of complex chemical com-
pounds or biological substances" which are characterized as being
not intended to be classified as "devices." Also, these could not
really be characterized as "basic aids used in the routine operation
of a hospital."' 99
Indeed, it would seem that the Supreme Court's decision in
Bacto-Unidisk cut back on the breadth of the construction of the
term "drug" as construed by the policy-oriented Second Circuit in
AMP Inc. v. Gardner. Thus, the optimism of the FDA after the
Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari in the AMP case to the
effect that this decision "revolutionizes the situation for a great
number of products, ranging from nails used in bone repair to
artificial eyes," and gives the FDA power to require preclearance
of all these products20 seems rather overexuberant in light of the
subsequent decision in Bacto-Unidisk. The position of the FDA
that it would be able to subject IUDs to premarket regulation 0 '
seems more plausible, not because of the AMP case, but, rather,
because of the decision in Bacto-Unidisk.20 2
Thus, it seems fair to say that the recent judicial decisions have
really not changed the overall situation with respect to medical
199. Id.
200. statement by counsel for the FDA, printed in the Washington (D.C.) Post, June
8, 1968, § - , at - , col. __ . This statement is quoted in Kleinfeld, Surgical Im-
plants: Drugs or Devices, and New Device Legislation, 23 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 510, 517-
18.
201. Id. 518.
202. The FDA has undertaken further regulation of IUDs and in vitro diagnostic prod-
ucts. A policy statement proposing to classify as "new drugs" intrauterine devices contain-
ing heavy metals, drugs, or other added substances has been released. 36 Fed. Reg. 10983
(1971). Notice has been given to manufacturers of in vitro diagnostic products for human
use (used solely to provide information on specimens taken from the body) that they must
conduct adequate premarket tests to demonstrate that their products are safe and effective
under the conditions described in their labeling. 37 Fed. Reg. 819 (1972). This notice states
that the Act provides "clear authority to exercise appropriate regulatory controls over these
producgs as devices and/or drugs" (emphasis added). The failure to conduct adequate
premarket tests may cause the product to be misbranded, the notice concludes. This appears
to be a novel way of attempting to impose a premarket clearance requirement without
specifically invoking the premarket clearance requirement for "new drugs" and without
taking a position that the products are "drugs" and "new drugs," rather than "devices."
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devices. They may still be marketed without prior proof of safety,
reliability, and effectiveness, and the burden is still on the Govern-
ment in actions to remove unsafe, unreliable, or ineffective devices
from the market. Furthermore, such devices are not within the
jurisdiction of the FDA at all unless "misbranded" or "adulter-
ated;" thus, as a practical matter, if the manufacturer avoids label-
ing which is "false and misleading in any particular," ' and does
not use any "filthy, putrid, or decomposed substance," or manu-
facture under "unsanitary conditions, ' 2 4 he is free to market his
device no matter how unsafe, unreliable, or ineffective it may be,
without being subjected to any regulation whatsoever.
Even if the recent decisions do give the FDA more leeway in
classifying new products as "drugs," it is still a poor compromise
in that it calls for a case-by-case determination, since manufactur-
ers will undoubtedly continue to maintain that their products are
"devices" so long as new "devices" are not subject to the same
regulation as "new drugs." Elimination of the dichotomy between
the regulation of drugs and devices as to premarket approval ap-
pears to be the most logical and practical way to prevent these
attempts at avoidance. 25
The argument that subjecting medical devices to preclearance
of federal standards, or both, will discourage research and inhibit
the development of new beneficial devices is not necessarily true.
Drug manufacturers have been functioning under the "new drug"
provisions for many years, and new products are constantly being
introduced. Such regulation could benefit the legitimate device
manufacturer who now voluntarily attempts to adequately premar-
ket test his products and make them as safe, reliable, and effective
as possible. Requiring such action from all manufacturers prior to
203. 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (1970).
204. 21 U.S.C. § 351(a)(1) & (2)(A) (1970).
205. A recent decision from the Fourth Circuit creates a new problem under the present
statutory framework of regulation. In a case presenting the issue of whether a product was
within the grandfather clause of the Drug Amendments of 1962 (note 28 supra) and there-
fore did not have to be generally recognized as effective (as well as safe), it was held that
the FDA has neither primary nor concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate whether a product
is a "drug" or a "new drug." Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Richardson, F.2d (4th Cir.
1972). Thus, this classification must be determined in court. The same result would seem
to follow from this decisions with respect to the issue of whether a product is a "drug" and
therefore perhaps a "new drug," rather than a "device." However, the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit has reached the opposite result in an even more recent case, holding
that the FDA does have jurisdiction, subject to judicial review, to decide whether a product
is a "new drug." Ciba Corp. v. Richardson, F.2d (3d Cir. 1972).
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marketing would tend to put them all on an equal footing and
protect the legitimate device manufacturer from those who are not
so legitimate and cut costs by minimizing or eliminating premarket
testing and by taking other manufacturing shortcuts. A set of uni-
form standards and a premarket clearance requirement would thus
both give increased protection to the public and benefit the manu-
facturer who is now engaging in the kinds of activity in which it
would be desirable for all manufacturrs to engage. Naturally, this
will probably increase the cost of the various medical devices; but
at least users of such devices will be getting the protection from
dangerous, worthless or inferior devices they now erroneously be-
lieve to be afforded by government regulation.
There should also be a great saving in cost and manpower to
the FDA, since the long, tedious, and frequently fruitless eizure
actions would be replaced by a procedure similar to that under the
"new drug" provisions, whereby the manufacturer would have to
submit data to the FDA proving that his device is safe, reliable,
and effective for its intended use before it could be legally mar-
keted. Thus, the amount of largely ineffective and inefficient reme-
dial enforcement would be reduced, and the amount of preventive
regulation would be increased. The FDA is now apparently badly
overburdened, but it is possible that this is largely due to the ineffi-
cient system under which it must operate-at least with respect to
medical devices. Lack of funds is also undoubtedly a problem. But,
in any event, whatever obstacles exist in this very vital area of
consumer protection should be overcome.
Proper legislation would not unnecessarily burden the manu-
facturers of legitimate medical devices, because it will presumably
require nothing more than that which most reputable manufactur-
ers are doing now. Also, only certain types of medical devices need
be subject to additional regulation; devices which do not present
significant possible dangers should not be needlessly encumbered.
Under this type of approach, research and development would not
be stifled and manufacturers and distributors of medical devices
would not be needlessly burdened, but the present unworkable legal
dilemma and the presently existing gap in consumer protection
would be remedied.
Since 1954, introduced into Congress were numerous bills
which would have required premarket approval of new devices by
the FDA.2 °6 House Bill 1235,07 which has been introduced in each
206. For a list of the bills introduced up through the 90th Congress which would have
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Congress since the 87th, would subject new devices to. premarket
clearance simply by inserting "or device" after the term "drug"
each time it appears in the "new drug" provisions. However, this
bill has been criticized as being too broad, since it would needlessly
subject all kinds of devices to premarket clearance, thereby impos-
ing an unnecessarily great administrative burden on the FDA211
and an unjustifiable economic burden on manufacturers.
As has become the pattern, pending before the present Con-
gress are a number of other bills which would subject medical
devices to varying further regulation. These proposals range from
a measure which merely calls for further study and recommenda-
tionS209 to one which would revise the entire administrative frame-
work for regulation of food, drugs, devices, and cosmetics. 210
Other proposed legislation ranges somewhere in between these
two extremes. These intermediate measures generally would au-
thorize either the Secretary of the Department of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare, or a proposed new entity, the Federal Medical
Evaluations Board,212 to establish standards for medical devices,
under varying circumstances, with interested parties being allowed
to participate. These bills also provide for premarket clearance of
certain medical devices, such as devices intended to be used within
the human body or intended to subject the human body to atomic
or electrical energy not generally recognized by qualified experts
as safe, reliable or effective for use as prescribed and devices found
to be unreasonably hazardous when used, as intended, in life-
required pretesting of new cosmetics, new devices, or both, see Weitzman, supra note 34,
at 249. Three bills introduced in the 91 st Congress would have authorized the Secretary of
HEW to establish device standards and would have required premarket clearance of certain
types of medical devices if not generally recognized by qualified experts as safe, reliable and
effective for their intended use. S. 2107, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969); H.R. 7315, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1969); and H.R. 16190, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). The devices these bills would
have subjected to preclearance were those (1) intended to be placed within the body or in
contract with mucous membrane indefinitely or for a long period of time, (2) intended to
be used to subject the body to radiation, electricity, or other types of energy, or (3) found
by the Secretary to present probable cause to believe that such devices were not safe,
reliable, or effective for their intended use.
207. 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
208. Styn, supra note 34, at 538.
209. H.R. 3122, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
210. S. 3419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
211. S. 1824, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (introduced by Senator Gaylord Nelson of
Wisconsin); S. 3028, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 12,316, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971);
H.R. 13,793, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); H.R. 14,230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
212. H.R. 925, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 2567, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971);
H.R. 3843, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 11, 983, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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threatening situations. Generally proposed by these bills is an
application-for-premarket-approval procedure similar to that for
"new drugs," as well as recordkeeping requirements, registration
of manufacturers, and specification of good manufacturing
practice.
Although most of the bills already mentioned have differing
provisions, and some are tougher than others, one current bill
stands apart from and takes a somewhat different approach than
the rest. House Bill 1545213 provides for a one-year study and
inventory of all medical devices by experts in the respective fields,
with the purpose of classifying devices into three categories. The
first category would consist of those devices generally recognized
as currently safe, reliable and effective for their intended uses and
would, therefore, be exempt from regulation. Devices which are
found to require reasonable standards to assure their safety, relia-
bility and effectiveness would comprise the second category. The
only devices subject to premarket clearance would be those in the
third category, consisting of devices either not generally recognized
as safe, reliable and effective or generally accepted but undergoing
continual change because of developing technology.
Various approaches for eliminating the present inconsistency
between the regulation of drugs and devices are suggested by the
pending bills. At least some of theseupproaches should afford some
basis for realistic regulation. In view of the past history of food and
drug legislation, where tragic events have resulted in overwhelming
public demand for immediwe remedial legislative action, the possi-
bility of such an event involving a medical device occurring in the
future and resulting in very restrictive regulation would seem to
indicate that medical device manufacturers might be wise to sup-
port reasonable legislation now, rather than have unduly burden-
some regulation forced upon them in a time of crisis. "'
CONCLUSION
The present dichotomy between the regulation of drugs and
213. 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971).
214. As of this writing, none of the bills mentioned herein, with one exception, have been
reported out of committee. The exception is S. 3419 (note 210 supra), which was passed by
the Senate, as amended, on June 21, 1972. Depending on the fate of this measure in the
House, medical devices may yet become subject to further regulation during the present
Congress. However, because this bill is such a broad measure, it would be very difficult to
predict what additional regulation of medical devices, if any, might be included in the final
version, should it become law.
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devices appears to have been inadvertently created by Congress.
The courts, when faced with this dichotomy, have been compelled
to resort to making public policy decisions in trying to resolve the
statutory ambiguities. The administrative agency presently respon-
sible for the regulation of drugs and medical devices has been
continually frustrated by its impotence to deal with the problems
posed by medical devices. The general public mistakenly believes
it is being afforded protection, and conscientious, legitimate manu-
facturers are put at a competitive disadvantage vis-A-vis manufac-
turers who do not voluntarily follow private standards and perform
adequate premarket testing of their products.
It appears that an eventual change in the federal law with
respect to regulation of medical devices is inevitable. When this
change will occur and what form it will take remains to be deter-
mined. However, it would seem to be in the best interests of all
concerned for such a change to occur before it is precipitated by
another national tragedy or near tragedy. Hurried, piecemeal legis-
lation seems to have caused the present confused statutory frame-
work; the confusion and inconsistency might better be corrected by
carefully considered comprehensive legislation now, with the de-
vice manufacturers participating in its formulation, than by legisla-
tion in the future, which might be enacted without full considera-
tion of its ramifications and consequences.
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